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Introduction and summary
Vibeke Wøien Hansen
European Union (EU) legislation daily affects millions of citizens in Europe. Legislation
is the main outcome of the European integration project and member state implementation of
EU laws is the easiest tangible measure of the project’s success. Hence, research on how the
decisions come about and how they are implemented across Europe is important for a variety of
reasons. One of the main reasons for investigating EU decision making is to assess the demo-
cratic quality of the law making. Governments ought to be accountable to their citizens also
when operating at the European level. Decision making should be as transparent as possible
and involve the accountable actors across the institutions. EU democracy or the lack thereof
has been a highly debated issue for the last two decades (Føllesdal and Hix, 2006; Moravc-
sik, 2002; Majone, 2000). This thesis contributes to the democratic deﬁcit debate in several
ways by showing that preferences matter throughout the decision-making process. First, when
preferences matter the most, decisions are reached formally and are thoroughly debated in the
Council of the European Union and the European Parliament (hereafter the Council and the EP).
Second, preferences are not fully erased by bargaining and can also hamper the implementation
process. Third, the legislative output is representative of the initial preferences of the national
governments. These ﬁndings all contribute to the positive aspect of the democratic legitimacy
debate.
The main motivation for this thesis is to connect preferences with observable behaviour
at all stages of the EU policy-making process. The following are the most important stages
in any policy-making process: 1) bargaining within a legislative body, 2) bargaining between
legislative bodies, 3) formal decisions, and 4) implementation of adopted policies. Including
implementation in the deﬁnition of a policy-making process ensures an exhaustive understand-
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ing of the process. In this thesis, the implications of preferences for all these stages of EU
decision making are investigated. The theoretical framework for this investigation is rational
choice theory which assumes that actors behave in a utility-maximising way (Downs, 1957;
Riker, 1962; Olson, 1982; Tsebelis and Garrett, 1996; Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997; Krehbiel,
1998; Tsebelis, 1999)
Although the research topic is the European Union (EU), the effect of preferences on decision-
making behaviour can be applicable to any policy-making body. The thesis ﬁnds a link between
preferences and choice of action in later stages of decision making. First, greater distance be-
tween the pivotal actors across the Council and the EP increase the probability of more than one
round of co-decision bargaining. Second, government preferences do have an effect on actual
voting behaviour in the Council. A negative preference is more likely to be associated with a
negative vote. Third, a negative vote has an effect on the implementation process. A negative
vote is more likely to be associated with poor implementation of EU directives by the member
states.
Showing that decision-making stages are connected by utility-maximising behaviour is the
ﬁrst contribution that this thesis makes to the existing literature on EU decision making. An-
other contribution is its combining of a variety of different data sources. Preference-based
data (Thomson and Stokman, 2003; Thomson, Stokman, Achen and König, 2006; Thomson,
Arregui, Leuffen, Costello, Cross, Hertz and Jensen, 2012) are combined with voting records
(Hagemann, 2007, 2008; Hagemann and Høyland, 2008) and implementation records (König
and Luetgert, 2009; Luetgert and Dannwolf, 2009; Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied, 2009). These
different data sources have previously been explored in isolation or have been employed to
investigate preference-based explanations for delayed implementation (Thomson, Arregui and
Torenvlied, 2007; Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied, 2009). In this thesis the three data sources are
combined to paint a broader, interconnected picture of EU decision making.
The overarching research questions that bind together the four papers that constitute the
thesis are the following:
1. (To what extent) can preferences explain behaviour in EU decision making?
2. (To what extent) can preferences account for variation in EU decision-making processes?
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In the ﬁrst paper (co-authored with Bjørn Høyland) the relationship between preferences
and voting behaviour is investigated. The second paper explores the relationship between pref-
erences and member state behaviour in the implementation process. Both papers utilise all the
variation in behaviour at the member state level. The third and fourth papers switch focus from
the member state level to the proposal level. The third paper investigates whether preferences
can explain some of the variation in the duration of law making or more speciﬁcally whether
voting behaviour and divergent preferences have consequences for the time needed to reach
agreement. The fourth paper examines whether the preferences of the pivotal actors across
the institutions can account for the variation in agreement stage in the co-decision procedure.
Drawing upon veto models with incomplete information, greater distance between the ideal
positions of the pivotal actors is assumed to be negatively associated with early agreement be-
tween the institutions. Altogether, these four papers connect preferences with behaviour of the
involved actors in all the aforementioned stages of EU decision making. The ﬁndings show that
preferences have a robust effect on behaviour throughout the decision-making process:
1. Preferences can account for voting behaviour: a negative preference increases the proba-
bility of voting “no” when the formal decision is taken.
2. Preferences in the bargaining have an effect on member state behaviour in the implemen-
tation process.
3. Preferences have an effect on bargaining time.
4. Preferences have an effect on the probability of ﬁrst reading non-agreement.
All these ﬁndings will be presented in detail later in this introduction. Figure 1, however,
summarises how the different papers are connected. The arrows indicate that the probability
of observing the event in the connected box increases. A negative preference is assumed to
increase the probability of a negative vote which again is assumed to increase the probability of
poor implementation. If the decision makers have divergent preferences, bargaining is assumed
to a) take more time and b) require more rounds (when the co-decision procedure applies).
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Figure 1: The impact of preferences on behaviour
The initial motivation for the thesis was to link Council voting behaviour to all stages of
the decision-making process. Although decision making in the Council is often characterised
as consensual (Lewis, 2000; Mattila and Lane, 2001; Lewis, 2003; Heisenberg, 2005; Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace, 2006), the published voting records show that one or more govern-
ments take dissent on more than 30 percent of all binding legislative proposals (Hagemann and
De Clerck-Sachsse, 2007).1 While the voting data has been thoroughly investigated in terms of
coalition partners, actor alignments and dimensions of conﬂict (Mattila and Lane, 2001; Mat-
tila, 2004; Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse, 2007; Hagemann and Høyland, 2008; Mattila,
2009), there is a lack of large N-studies that explore the impact of voting behaviour in a broader
setting of EU decision making. The different components in this thesis seek to paint a full
picture of the implications of Council voting for EU decision making. However, in order to
investigate the effect of voting behaviour, it is also necessary to assess the effect of preferences.
Voting is a product of preferences and bargaining. A vote choice can be a proxy for the voter’s
preference but is not necessarily so (see for instance Hagemann (2006)). Hence, treating an ob-
1This estimate includes opposition shown by formal statements.
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served vote as an indication of the voter’s preference is a testable assumption. This assumption
is tested in the ﬁrst paper of the thesis and the analysis shows that preferences and voting are
interlinked. Hence, in the remaining three papers several indicators of preferences (including
preferences revealed by voting) are tested in order to fully evaluate the effect of preferences on
observable behaviour in the EU decision-making process. Note that this thesis does not attempt
to investigate why some member states vote against a proposal and others do not beyond the
assumption that preferences matter. While there is evidence for national economic and social
interests determining member state vote choice in the Council (Bailer, Mattila and Schneider,
2010), the analyses in this thesis do not explicitly examine structural reasons for observed voting
behaviour.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND MAIN HYPOTHESES
The main assumption for this thesis’ theoretical framework is instrumental rationality. The
actors in the EU decision-making process are acting in accordance with their preferences and
beliefs. In the rational choice literature the cause-and-effect relationships between actions and
outcomes are seen as certain, risky or uncertain (Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997). In the setting of
the European Union where the group size has continuously increased, from initially six member
states in 1957 (EEC) to 28 member states in 2013, the cause-and-effect relationship can mostly
be said to be risky or uncertain. Acting upon a preference for a ﬁnal outcome, and in accordance
with a belief about the best way to pursue this outcome, does not guarantee that the outcome
will be reached. However, when maximising own utility, given the uncertainty with regard to
the other actors’ behaviour, actor i can be better off by acting in line with that actor’s prefer-
ences than by choosing not to do so. Moreover, acting rationally requires ranking the different
outcomes and then choosing the action that is likely to maximize the highest ranked outcome
(Riker and Ordershook, 1968). In this thesis, it is assumed that EU decision makers are rational
actors with Euclidean preferences. That means that the actors prefer policy outcomes close to
their own ideal positions over policy outcomes farther away.
Rational choice-based literature on decision making in the EU generally assumes that gov-
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ernments have preferences over policies, and act with the aim of moving policies closer to their
most preferred policy outcome (ideal-point) or to prevent policies that are farther away from
their ideal-point than the current policy (the status quo) from being adopted. Figure 2 shows
the underlying logic of the theoretical framework. In this simple spatial representation of one
actor’s (i) position vis-a-vis the old and new policy, the ideal position of actor i is located closer
to the old policy than to the new policy. Actor i will thus seek to prevent the new policy from
being adopted as i prefers the old policy (the status quo) over the new proposal.
SQ Actor i New policy 
Figure 2: Scenario where actor i prefers the old policy (SQ) over the new policy
Rational choice theory is the foundation for a variety of studies in the EU literature. Game
theory-based literature on decision making in the EU has traditionally aimed to establish the
beneﬁts of being agenda setters and veto players, and the location of the decision outcome,
to determine the power relations between the institutions under the different legislative proce-
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dures (Steunenberg, 1994; Tsebelis and Garrett, 1996; Crombez, 1996; Moser, 1996; Scully,
1997; Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000). Game theory can also be used to model situations of legisla-
tive gridlock (Crombez and Hix, 2013), bargaining power (Schneider, Finke and Bailer, 2010),
democratic implications of the decision-making process (Crombez, 2003), and the relationship
between the principal and the agent at the different levels of EU decision making (Hug, 2003a).
Large N-studies on EU decision making have utilised rational choice theory in different
ways. Actor alignment in the Council (e.g. Mattila, 2004; Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins,
2005; Mattila, 2009; Thomson, 2009a) is a product of preferences and voting behaviour. Some
governments manage to secure a policy outcome closer to their own interests than others (e.g.
Bailer, 2004; Arregui and Thomson, 2009; Cross, 2013). A high degree of heterogeneity in pref-
erences increases the probability of failed implementation (König and Luetgert, 2009). Prefer-
ences far away from the policy outcome increase the probability of implementation infringe-
ments detected and enforced by the Commission (Thomson, Arregui and Torenvlied, 2007).
The general theoretical approach in this thesis builds upon this literature. It is assumed that
preferences are connected with observable behaviour, and that variation in preferences has an
effect on the various stages of the decision-making process. The actors are assumed to be-
have in a rational manner in all stages of decision making. The main theoretical contribution is
thus to follow this logic throughout the decision-making process beginning with the bargaining
stage and ending with the implementation stage. The theoretical assumptions are illustrated in
a simpliﬁed manner in Figure 3. The ﬁgure is drawn as a game tree to illustrate that actor i
has different choices in a decision-making process. The bold paths are the paths that can be
directly derived by backward induction. In the rational choice theory framework, actor i’s pref-
erence determines voting behaviour, which again determines implementation behaviour. Hence,
observing poor implementation at the end of the decision-making process should indicate that
such behaviour stems from a negative position on the adopted policy. Note, however, that Fig-
ure 3 illustrates a simpliﬁed theoretical argument. Several other variables may distort any direct
relationship between the bargaining phase and the implementation phase. Hence, the statistical
analyses control for other explanations that can account for (non)compliance. For instance, the
level of discretion attached to a directive or the perceived effectiveness of the different national
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governments can also contribute to explaining the observed implementation pattern across the
EU member states.
Preference  
of actor i  
Implement 
Vote 
Implement 
Implement 
Vote 
Implement 
positive 
negative 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
Figure 3: Illustration of theoretical approach
The ﬁrst and second papers of the thesis investigate these two paths. The ﬁrst paper inves-
tigates whether there is a connection between preferences and voting in the Council. The main
expectation of the analysis in this paper is the following:
• H1: Preferences that are far away from a policy outcome increase the probability of
dissent at the voting stage.
The second paper investigates whether preferences and votes affect member state imple-
mentation behaviour. In this paper there are two expectations that relate explicitly to the general
theoretical framework:
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• H2: Preferences that are far away from a policy outcome increase the probability of poor
implementation of this particular policy.
• H3: Dissent taken at the voting stage increases the probability of poor implementation of
this particular policy.
The third and fourth paper look at the decision-making process prior to the implementation
stage and ask whether the preferences of the EU decision makers can account for some of the
variation in the different processes. The third paper investigates whether the duration of decision
making is affected by the preferences held by the actors involved. The main expectation of this
particular analysis is that preference-based indicators of disagreement (including negative votes
and inter-institutional ideological distance) prolong the time it takes to reach a formal decision:
• H4: Preference-based disagreement increases the duration of EU decision-making.
The fourth paper examines whether the preferences of the pivotal actors have an impact on
observed decision-making behaviour across the institutions. More speciﬁcally, the analysis in
the fourth paper seeks to explain why some agreements, under the co-decision procedure, are
reached early and others are reached at later stages. The main expectation here is that greater
distance between the pivotal actors across the institutions is negatively related to ﬁrst-reading
agreement in the EU:
• H5: Preference-based disagreement reduces the probability of ﬁrst-reading agreement
across institutions.
These two papers also control for explanations for observing paths (in Figure 3) that diverge
from a strict instrumental rationality assumption in the different stages of a decision-making
process. For instance, on non-salient and noncontroversial legislation the incentives for acting
upon preferences are reduced and the above expectations no longer hold to the same extent.
The analyses thus control for the salience attached to the proposal and whether the proposal
content spurred extensive inter-institutional discussion. The latter is measured by whether the
EP amended the proposal or not. Proposals without EP amendments can be regarded as standard
legislation of an uncontroversial character. In these cases the EP has deliberately chosen not
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to utilise its agenda-setting powers (in the sense of initiating amendments to the proposal in
question) (Tsebelis, 1994).
Alternative theoretical explanations
The theoretical framework employed in this thesis is just one of many theoretical frameworks
that can shed light on the dynamics of EU decision making. Alternative theoretical explanations
may equally well account for the observed phenomena as the explanations provided for in the
four papers in this thesis. Furthermore, competing explanations are not necessarily mutually ex-
clusive. Consensus norm explanations of Council law making can coexist with a rational choice
explanation of member state voting behaviour. The ﬁrst type of explanation focuses on social-
isation and learning processes (Heisenberg, 2005; Lewis, 2000, 2003). New member states are
immediately introduced to the norms governing “the culture of consensus” in the Council. The
frequent meetings and negotiations lead to high levels of trust among the members which again
lead to higher reputation costs. This facilitates a diffuse form of reciprocity where the different
actors do not expect their needs to be immediately met. However, any culture of consensus does
not directly imply that member states vote against their preferences. It just indicates that the
result of bargaining is a compromise that most of the actors have few difﬁculties in adopting to
(Thomson et al., 2006; Häge, 2013).
Similarly, path dependence in EU decision making does not mean that EU decision makers
cannot pursue their goals and preferences in a rational manner. While path dependence certainly
can restrict the possible choices of each actor, it does not imply that the actors cannot choose
the best action available for promoting their own interests. The concept of path dependence is
crucial to the theoretical tradition of historical institutionalism (March and Olsen, 1989). Tim-
ing and sequence shape speciﬁc historical patterns that are difﬁcult to reverse (Pierson, 2000).
In the EU context, the products of path dependence have created gaps in member state control.
These gaps are, in the long run, likely to be at odds with the initial preferences of most of the
member states. Such gaps can result from various factors. The restricted time horizons of EU
decision makers, the autonomous actions of supranational actors (i.e. the Commission and the
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European Court of Justice), unintended consequences, and shifts in the preference conﬁguration
within the Council are all factors that are likely to reduce member-state control of the integra-
tion process (Pierson, 1996). Historical institutionalism is often portrayed in sharp contrast
to the theoretical tradition of intergovernmentalism. According to this tradition, member state
interests are at the forefront of the integration process (Moravcsik, 1993). Although integovern-
mentalist accounts are embedded in the framework of rational choice, this does not mean that
rational choice institutionalism cannot live side by side with historical institutionalism. The
former tradition also includes studies that focus on the signiﬁcance of historical processes (e.g.
North, 1990).
However, the emphasis of this thesis on preference-driven behaviour can clearly be criti-
cised by proponents of historical institutionalism. Some of the factors that potentially make
preferences less important in the decision-making process are controlled for in the subsequent
analyses. For instance, in the analysis of member state implementation of EU directives (Paper
2), the behaviour and interests of the Commission are accounted for. Any shifts in preference
conﬁguration within the Council are also controlled for by including a variable of ideologi-
cal distance. This variable accounts for the (ideological) effect of government changes in the
different member states. But any relationship between voting behaviour and implementation
behaviour can clearly be affected by shifts in national governments. Directives should usually
be implemented within two years of adoption. The government that implements a policy is
thus not necessarily the same government that adopted it. When the preferences of the new and
old governments are signiﬁcantly different from each other, the link between voting behaviour
and implementation behaviour diminishes. In cases where voting behaviour is a product of na-
tional issues that are independent of government composition, this link will prevail. Despite the
uncertainty created by possible government changes, the effect of voting behaviour on imple-
mentation behaviour can be thoroughly explored in a large N-framework.
Constraints can clearly also make it harder to act upon preferences. We can then talk about
bounded rationality instead of rationality in a strict sense. The concept of bounded rationality
stems from the observation that rational actors are signiﬁcantly affected by constraints raised
by limited information and complex environments (Simon, 1955). The ﬁnal paper in this thesis
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directly investigates the issue of bounded rationality in inter-institutional bargaining. Here,
insights derived from veto models with incomplete information are applied to the setting of
EU decision-making under the co-decision procedure. While this thesis employs a simpliﬁed
theoretical framework that only provides one understanding of decision-making dynamics, the
research design is constructed to tackle some of the criticisms raised by competing (however,
not necessarily incompatible) theoretical accounts.
DATA AND METHODS
All four papers in this thesis apply some sort of statistical model to answer the research ques-
tions raised in the different papers. The desire to account for the variation in EU decision-
making processes over a longer time frame (1999-2009) is the main argument for choosing a
quantitative framework for the thesis. However, this choice contains some problematic issues
that need to be addressed. First and foremost there are several selection biases in data on EU
decision making. First, only adopted legislation is reported in the voting records. Second, the
member states are the ones that report whether or not a legislative act is implemented on time.
Third, the Commission selects which of the poorly implemented acts (infringements) demand
further legal action. After presenting the main data sources, these and other data problems are
further discussed.2
All four papers in the thesis employ data on Council voting. This type of data ﬁrst became
available to the public in the 1990s and before that decade no minutes from Council meetings
were recorded (Mattila and Lane, 2001). In 1993 the Council and the Commission speciﬁed
a “code of conduct” which stated that EU citizens were granted “the widest possible access to
documents” (Stasavage, 2004). In practice, this meant that access to documents would only be
permitted if the Council members agreed to release the requested documents. The Guardian
made big headlines when their journalist John Carvel was denied access to a number of Council
documents. The newspaper took the case to European Court of First Instance and since the
judgment (which was in favour of the newspaper) the Council has gradually become more
2see Figure 4 for an overview of the data sources that are used in the different papers.
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transparent. In 2001, Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 was adopted. This regulation set out
the principles for how legislative records from the Commission, the Council, and the European
Parliament (EP) should be released to the public. The result of this regulation is several online
databases. One of these is of the Council voting records which are published in the Council
minutes and in the monthly summaries of Council acts.3 These data sources contain legislative
records from 1999 and onwards. In this thesis, both data sources are used to construct the
voting variables. Data on the years before the 2004 Eastern European enlargement are taken
from Hagemann and Høyland (2008). This data also stems from the Council minutes.
The second data source which is employed in all four papers is the European Commission
database PreLex.4 PreLex keeps track of the interactions between the EU institutions on both
legislative and non-legislative proposals over time. This data source is consulted to generate
variables such as ministerial involvement and additional information on voting rules and the
various stages of EU decision making. Data on preferences, in terms of issue-speciﬁc posi-
tions on a set of controversial proposals, are taken from the “Decision Making in the European
Union” (DEU) data set. The DEU data consists of member states’ policy positions on 331
controversial issues raised in 125 legislative proposals initiated by the Commission. The in-
formation was collected through 349 expert interviews (Thomson et al., 2006, 2012). In the
interviews, the Commission, the EP and the member states were assigned positions. The po-
sitions on each issue were estimated along a standardised policy scale with values between 0
and 100. The numerical differences between the actors reﬂect the political distance between
them (Thomson and Stokman, 2003). Also, the reference point (similar to the status quo), the
decision outcome of each issue, and the level of salience that each actor attached to each issue
were deﬁned along this continuum. The DEU data are employed in the ﬁrst, second and fourth
paper of the thesis.
The data on implementation stem from the EU database EUR-Lex and the annual reports on
national implementation of EU law.5 EUR-Lex keeps track on all EU laws and the implemen-
tation of these. The data on implementation after the 2004 enlargement is coded speciﬁcally
3see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/documents/legislative-transparency/
4see http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/
5see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm
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for this thesis. For the proposals adopted before the enlargement the thesis utilises a data set
employed in a study by Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied (2009) which is also based on the afore-
mentioned sources. The third and fourth paper employ data from the European Union Policy
Making (EUPOL) data set (Häge, 2011a).
Data on issue-speciﬁc ideological preference proﬁles of political parties are taken from the
EULIS data set (König and Luig, 2012) and combined with cabinet information from the Parl-
Gov data set (Döring and Manow, 2011) in order to measure preference distance within the
Council and across the Council and the EP. This type of data is employed in the third and fourth
papers of the thesis.
Data limitations
The data sources employed in this thesis cannot fully present a correct picture of EU decision
making. This is a common drawback of a large N-study and can only be remedied by additional
case studies (see Luetgert and Dannwolf (2009) for an example of this valuable approach).
Even so, large N-studies facilitate an opportunity to exploit the variation in EU decision making
and to make fairly certain conclusions about why decision-making processes differ from each
other. With that said, all the ﬁndings in the thesis have to be interpreted in light of the main data
limitations (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994). There are limitations and selection biases in all
the employed data sources. Although researchers try to tackle these in the best possible ways,
these issues cannot be entirely solved in a large-N study such as this thesis.
Approximately 89 percent of the available legislative data are adopted legislation (Häge,
2011a). Proposed legislation fails be adopted in about 11 percent of the reported cases in
PreLex. These proposals are withdrawn by the Commission. The withdrawn proposals are usu-
ally not reported in the Council minutes and are thus not a part of the voting records. The same
can be said of votes on proposals that did not manage to attract the required support. If enough
governments oppose, legislation will neither be adopted nor will there be any record of the vote.
As the Guardian example shows, the Council may also choose not to publish particular legisla-
tive records. In fact, Council ofﬁcials stress that only the voting records published from 2006
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and onwards can be regarded as complete.6 There is thus a selection bias in this data source.
Such a bias leads to ﬂawed conclusions when data sets are incomplete (Hug, 2003b). When
the recording of voting decisions is partial, the recorded votes may provide a biased sample
of the whole population of votes (Hug, 2010). Council researchers are well aware of this bias
but have yet to address the magnitude of this problem. The ﬁrst paper in this thesis concludes
by proposing that the selection bias can be accounted for through a simpliﬁed selection model
(Little and Rubin, 2002; Zhang and Wang, 2012). While it cannot be claimed that such an ap-
proach is capable of fully accounting for the selection bias in the recorded Council votes, it may
represent a step towards a richer account of voting in the Council.
There is also selection bias in quantitative data on the implementation of EU directives. It
is the member states that notify the Commission when they have made the necessary measures
to comply with a directive.7 The member states are supposed to comply with a directive within
a given deadline. However, in several cases the deadline has not been met. The number of
measures necessary to implement a directive vary with the existing national legislation in each
member state. Hence, researchers usually use the date of the ﬁrst notiﬁed measure to code
whether a directive was implemented on time (König and Luetgert, 2009).8 This does not mean
that a directive has been correctly implemented. Such a variable (transposition delay) can only
indicate whether a member state took some steps to implement a directive before the deadline,
whether it took some steps to implement a directive after the deadline, or whether it has yet to
notify the Commission of any measures. Due to the extent of incompletely implemented direc-
tives, the Commission does not have the capacity to enforce all the infringements that the mem-
ber states commit in the implementation process (Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp and Leiber, 2005).
This is another source of selection bias in the implementation data. The Commission needs to
6This information stems from the informal interview I conducted with two Council ofﬁcials, Jakob Thomsen
and Carla Santos Moore, in Brussels in November 2012. Both were then working in Unit 2A-Document Access
and Legislative Transparency. They also mentioned that a new and improved database was planned for release in
2014.
7I visited EUR-Lex (a part of the Publications Ofﬁce of the European Union) in November 2012 for an informal
interview on their data generation process. EUR-Lex contains information on the implementation notiﬁcations
made by the member states. EUR-Lex ofﬁcials told me that this database could be biased in at least two different
ways: 1) The member states can forget to notify the Commission and 2) The Commission can forget to report the
national measures taken to the EUR-Lex system. Such incidences delay and bias the database content.
8However, several researchers use more ﬁne-grained measures of transposition (e.g. König and Luetgert, 2009;
Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009; Thomson, 2010; König and Mäder, 2013; Zhelyazkova, 2013).
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prioritise from among various infringements when initiating infringement proceedings. Hence,
studies on both sources of implementation failure, transposition delay and infringements, are
needed to address the effect of preferences on implementation behaviour. This thesis hence
employs both data sources in the quantitative analyses.
A fourth type of selection bias issues are found in the positional data set (DEU). First, only
somewhat controversial proposals are part of this data set. Due to the chosen research questions,
controversy was the main selection criteria for the data collection. In hindsight, some pre-2004
proposals were shown to be less controversial that at ﬁrst assessment (Thomson et al., 2012).
Even so, studies employing this data source may overstate the extent of disagreement within
the Council. Any exaggeration of the overall disagreement level is, however, a necessary bi-
product of this research project, as empirical tests of spatial models of decision making rely
on variation in actors’ positions. On uncontroversial legislation, the variation in positions is
likely to be limited. Second, the interviews were conducted after the proposals were negotiated.
The preferences attributed to the different actors may hence deviate somewhat from their actual
preferences. Third, the selection of issues within a proposal may not be the only important
factors that came up in the bargaining. The DEU data was cross-checked by König, Lindberg,
Lechner and Pohlmeier (2007) who compared the DEU data with their own interview based
positional data. Although different experts were interviewed by the two teams of researchers,
the cross-examination revealed a high match between the point estimates of the location of the
status quo, the decision outcome, and the positions of the different actors in the two data sets.
This cross-check thus mitigates the criticism of the reliability and validity of the DEU data to
some extent.
In general, the implications of the various selection biases for the ﬁndings presented in
this thesis are likely to be of a conservative nature although this cannot be known with cer-
tainty. The detected relationships might be assumed to be even stronger if selection bias was
accounted for. First, there are no theoretical reasons for expecting that the identiﬁed relationship
between preference-based positions and votes would change if data on failed legislation existed.
Second, improved measures of implementation could result in a stronger relationship between
preferences and (non)compliance. The latter argument is supported by the studies conducted by
16
Thomson (2010), König and Mäder (2013), and Zhelyazkova (2013) which all introduce more
ﬁne-grained measures of compliance.
Choice of statistical models
Several different statistical modelling techniques are used in this thesis. The choice of modelling
technique is based on the speciﬁc research question and the available data. In the ﬁrst paper, the
chosen statistical model is a hierarchical probit model that accounts for the uncertainty related
to imputation of missing positions and easily accommodates the hierarchical structure of the
data by employing Bayesian simulation (Gelman and Hill, 2007; Jackman, 2009). The anal-
yses in the second and third paper both investigate the duration of one stage in the (broader)
decision-making process. The second paper looks at whether or not member states comply
with a directive within the transposition deadline. The third paper investigates whether the du-
ration of the bargaining phase varies with the level of disagreement at the proposal level. In
both papers, the dependent variable is the time it takes before the applicable event occurs (im-
plementation and adoption, respectively). Hence, an event history modelling technique (often
referred to as survival analysis) is applied to model the processes of change. Event history anal-
ysis allows for studying the probability that an event happens on any given day provided that
it has not happened before (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004; Cleves, Gould, Gutierrez and
Marchenko, 2008).
The paper on implementation (Paper 2) also employs logistic regression to model the likeli-
hood of infringements. The same method is used in the fourth paper to model the likelihood of
ﬁrst reading decisions. The choice of logistic regression in these two papers is in line with the
previous literature (Thomson, Arregui and Torenvlied, 2007; Rasmussen, 2011; Reh, Héritier,
Bressanelli and Koop, 2013). This facilitates a direct comparison with the previous ﬁndings in
the literature.
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INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND EVOLVEMENT OF THE EU IN THE TIME FRAME OF
THE THESIS
This thesis considers mainly legislation adopted between 1999 and 2009. There are several
reasons for this time frame. First, the Council voting records are only available from 1999
and onwards. Second, the reform of the co-decision procedure, which is instrumental to the
research design of the fourth paper, was introduced in 1999. Third, the utilised data sets all
span over this time frame. During these ten years the EU has been subject to three different
treaties; the Treaty of Amsterdam (entered into force 1 May 1999), the Treaty of Nice (entered
into force 1 February 2003), and the Treaty of Lisbon (entered into force 1 December 2009).
The reforms introduced by the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice have had explicit implications
for the research design of this thesis. The Amsterdam Treaty paved the way for increased usage
of the co-decision procedure (where the Council and the EP are coequal legislators). The Nice
Treaty ensured a smoother transition with regard to the accession of ten more member states.
The thesis is thus designed to exploit and to account for these reforms.
While legislation was initially adopted through the consultation procedure where the EP
only had the power to delay a Council decision in the ﬁrst and only reading of the legislative pro-
cess, reforms introduced by the Single European Act (1987), the Maastricht Treaty (1993), and
the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) incrementally made EU legislative politics bicameral (Hix and
Høyland, 2011, 52-53). The revision of the co-decision procedure by the Amsterdam Treaty,
in particular, formalised the power of the EP and made the two institutions coequal legislators
(Hix, 2002). In addition to extending the scope of this procedure, the Amsterdam reform had
two important consequences: (1) If there is agreement between the institutions, legislation can
be adopted already in the ﬁrst reading, and (2) if no agreement can be reached in the conciliation
committee, no legislation will be adopted. Hence, the Council could no longer give the EP a
“take it or leave it” proposal following a breakdown of the conciliation committee, the last stage
of the procedure. The ﬁrst implication makes it possible to apply the insights generated by veto
bargaining models with incomplete information to EU decision making. Such models exploit
the features of sequential bargaining with the possibility to extend over more than one round of
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bargaining (Cameron and McCarty, 2004). While co-decision proposals can be agreed upon in
the ﬁrst round, decision-making also frequently extends to further rounds.
The issue of Eastern European enlargement in 2004 (ten new member states) and 2007
(two new member states) is accounted for when the data sets utilised include proposals adopted
after this increase in group size. Papers 2 and 4 add a dummy variable for Enlargement in the
statistical analyses.
The dynamics of EU decision making are complex. Hence, each paper of this thesis seeks
to provide the reader with the necessary background information to understand the logic of the
different arguments and the reasons for the choices made with regard to the research designs.
CONTENT OF THESIS
This thesis consists of four independent papers. The individual papers are, however, related
to each other and some overlap in content is inevitable, especially with regard to the theoreti-
cal sections and descriptions of methods and data sources. All papers have been presented at
conferences and/or workshops. Paper 1 has been accepted for publication in European Union
Politics (EUP) and is forthcoming in 2014. Paper 4 has a “revise and resubmit” from the same
journal.9 The remaining two papers are both submitted to journals.
Figure 4 summarises the research design, data sources and main ﬁndings of the four papers
in the thesis.
Paper summaries
Issue-speciﬁc policy positions and voting in the Council (co-authored with Bjørn Høyland
This paper links the bargaining stage with the voting stage and addresses the Janus-face of
politics in the Council. There is bargaining with identiﬁable winners and losers, yet the vot-
9I received the “revise and resubmit” decision from EUP on December 13th, 2013. Hence, I have not had the
chance to implement the valuable suggestions of the four reviewers before submitting this thesis.
19
Paper 
Research 
question 
Data Statistical model Dependent variable Main finding 
1) Issue-specific policy 
positions and voting in 
the Council 
(with Bjørn Høyland) 
1 Council voting data, 
DEU data set 
(Thomson, 2006, 
Thomson et al., 2012), 
PreLex 
Hierarchical probit 
model (MCMC) 
Member state vote 
choice 
Governments are guided by 
their issue-specific 
preferences when voting in 
the Council 
2) Linking the 
bargaining stage with 
the implementation 
stage: A preference-
based explanation for 
non-compliance 
1 Council voting data, 
transposition records 
(EUR-Lex), 
Zhelyazkova and 
Torenvlied, 2009), 
infringement data, 
DEU data set 
(Thomson, 2006, 
Thomson et al., 2012), 
PreLex 
 
Logistic regression and 
Cox proportional 
hazard regression 
(event history 
analysis) 
Member state 
implementation 
behaviour: 
1) Infringements 
2) Transposition 
delay 
Preference-based 
explanations for non-
compliance perform better 
when accounting for 
infringements than 
transposition delay 
3) Exploring preference-
based determinants of 
the duration of EU 
decision making 
2 EUPOL data set (Häge 
2011), Council voting 
data,  EULIS data set 
(König and Luig, 2012), 
PreLex 
Cox proportional 
hazard regression 
(event history 
analysis) 
Proposal level: 
Bargaining time 
Dissent in Council voting 
and inter-institutional 
preference divergence slow 
down EU decision making 
4) Incomplete 
information and 
bargaining in the EU: An 
explanation of first-
reading non-
agreements 
2 DEU data set 
(Thomson, 2006, 
Thomson et al., 2012), 
EUPOL data set (Häge, 
2007, Häge, 2011), 
Council voting data, 
EULIS data set (König 
and Luig, 2012), 
PreLex 
Logistic regression Proposal and issue 
level: First-reading 
agreement 
First-reading agreements 
are less likely to occur (1) 
the greater the distance 
between the ideal points of 
the pivotal actors and (2) 
the greater the salience 
attached to the proposal 
            
Figure 4: Summary of papers in the thesis
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ing records show high levels of agreement. These phenomena have almost exclusively been
studied in isolation even though standard theoretical models of voting typically assume that
actors’ behaviour is guided by their positions relative to the new proposal and the status quo.
By combining positional data and voting data, this paper evaluates the extent to which voting is
driven by salience-weighted issue-speciﬁc positions. The results show that governments’ voting
behaviour is guided by their issue-speciﬁc positions. Positions and voting behaviour are inter-
connected. However, the relationship between preference-based positions and votes is stronger
when values for the missing positions in the positional data are imputed on an issue-by-issue ba-
sis. This ﬁnding illustrates the importance of cautious treatment of missing data in EU decision
making. Missing positions are thus also similarly imputed when this type of data is employed
in the other papers of this thesis.
Linking the bargaining stage with the implementation stage: A preference-based explanation
for non-compliance
This paper relates the bargaining and voting stage to the implementation stage in EU decision
making. To what extent can non-compliance be accounted for by the preferences of the Council
members at the bargaining stage? Preferences that are not in line with the adopted policy can
provide actors with an incentive to deviate when implementing this policy. The question is
whether such an incentive to deviate has an actual effect on the implementing behaviour of the
member states. This paper investigates the relationship between preference-based indicators and
non-compliance in the EU by employing two different operationalisations of implementation
performance as the dependent variable in the analyses. The analysed data set consists of 41
directives adopted before and after the 2004 enlargement. The main ﬁnding is that a preference-
based explanation for non-compliance is supported when the dependent variable is measured
as non-compliance (infringements) detected and enforced by the Commission. The odds of
infringements increase when member states have preferences far away from the policy outcome
or are outvoted in the decision making, and when there is greater variation in the distribution
of preferences within the Council. On the other hand, a preference-based explanation is not
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supported when transposition delay is employed as the dependent variable. In this type of
analysis, conﬂict in the bargaining actually speeds up transposition. Such a ﬁnding is in line
with the monitoring and managing explanation where the Commission acts as problem-solver
to ease member state implementation.
Exploring preference-based determinants of the duration of EU decision making
This paper investigates how controversy and conﬂict in the negotiations affect decision-making
efﬁciency in the EU. The quantitative analysis conducted on 670 co-decision proposals adopted
between 1999-2009 shows that preference divergence has a robust effect on the duration of EU
decision making. Proposals where one or more member states objected at the voting stage have
longer bargaining stages than consensual proposals. Greater distance between the ideal points
of the pivotal actors in the Council and the European Parliament increases the time it takes to
adopt legislation. Highly salient proposals and proposals that receive actual ministerial attention
also take longer to decide than less salient proposals and proposals that can be agreed upon at
lower levels. The need to strike an agreeable compromise on controversial proposals thus has a
signiﬁcant time cost. Controversy and conﬂict slows down EU decision making.
Incomplete information and bargaining in the EU: An explanation of ﬁrst-reading
non-agreements
This paper links preference divergence to the probability of ﬁrst-reading agreement under the or-
dinary legislative procedure (co-decision). The theoretical framework is based on veto bargain-
ing models. Standard models of veto bargaining show that if all actors are completely informed
about the preferences of the other actors, vetoes should not be observed. Following this logic,
under the assumption of complete information, bargaining in the European Union (EU) should
never reach the second reading of the co-decision procedure. Even so, non-agreement at the
ﬁrst-reading stage occurs frequently in EU decision making. How can this be explained? Draw-
ing upon game theory on bargaining under incomplete information, two speciﬁc predictions
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with regard to the occurrence of ﬁrst-reading non-agreements can be generated. First-reading
agreements are less likely to occur (1) the greater the distance between the ideal point of the
Council and the ideal point of the European Parliament (EP) and (2) the greater the salience
attached to the proposal. This paper ﬁnds robust support for both hypotheses in two differ-
ent empirical tests. The ﬁrst test is based on positional data while the second test is based
on proposal-speciﬁc data. While previous EU studies have shown an increase in the number
of ﬁrst-reading agreements, these studies have not attempted to explain why not all proposals
are agreed upon at the ﬁrst-reading stage. This analysis thus contributes to the existing lit-
erature by providing a theory-driven micro-level explanation of ﬁrst-reading non-agreements.
Furthermore, the ﬁndings also relate to the positive side of the democratic legitimacy debate by
showing that particularly important and controversial legislation is decided transparently with
the involvement of accountable actors.
THESIS CONTRIBUTION
This section seeks to outline the general contribution of the thesis. Ideally, a research project
should satisfy two criteria: 1) “a research project should pose a question that is “important”
in the real world” and 2) “a research question should make a speciﬁc contribution to an iden-
tiﬁable scholarly literature by increasing our collective ability to construct veriﬁed scientiﬁc
explanations of some aspect of the world” (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, 15). The following
explains how this research project has endeavoured to meet these two criteria.
Relevance of the argument
To put it simply, the ﬁndings in this thesis show that preferences have an effect on observed
behaviour, the EU decision makers act in accordance with their preferences. In sum, the dif-
ferent quantitative analyses show that: 1) preferences have an effect on voting behaviour, 2)
preferences have an effect on implementation behaviour, 3) negative preferences (as revealed
in voting) increase bargaining duration and 4) larger preference divergence between the pivotal
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actors increases the probability of more than one round of inter-institutional decision making.
The main argument has, in particular, three different side effects that can be considered
to be substantially important. First, the ﬁndings, in general, contribute to the positive side
of the democratic legitimacy debate. For the millions of citizens whose lives are affected by
the EU on a daily basis, it is reassuring to know that 1) the decision makers are relatively
transparent in their motivation, they act in line with their initial preferences, 2) the decision
makers seek to promote the interests of their home constituency also at the European arena,
bargaining is tougher when there is large variation in preferences, and 3) controversial and
highly salient dossiers are negotiated transparently with the involvement of accountable actors.
Second, this thesis does not (nor does it attempt to) rule out that behaviour is guided by strategic
considerations. However, it is shown that preferences can contribute to explaining observable
behaviour. This supports the relevance of rational choice theory when seeking to explain EU
decision making or decision making in general. Third, the research design and ﬁndings may also
be applicable to other international decision-making bodies such as the United Nations Security
Council, the World Trade Organization and the World Bank, as well as decision-making bodies
at the national level. This enhances the importance and relevance of the main argument.
Contribution to the literature
This thesis makes several contributions to the existing literature. King, Keohane and Verba
(1994) list some possible ways to proceed when a researcher wants to locate a research project
within the framework of existing social science literature. The different components in this
thesis are based upon several of these listed possibilities. The research design is embedded in
four explicit motivations in particular:
1. “Attempt to resolve or provide further evidence of one side in the literature–perhaps
demonstrate that the controversy was unfounded from the start”.
2. “Design research to illuminate or evaluate unquestioned assumptions in the literature”.
3. “Argue that an important topic has been overlooked in the literature and then proceed to
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contribute a systematic study to the area”.
4. “Show that theories or evidence designed for some purpose in one literature could be ap-
plied in another literature to solve an existing but apparently unrelated problem” (King,
Keohane and Verba, 1994, 16-17).
The initial motivation of the thesis was to make a systematic study of the effects of Council
voting behaviour on the EU decision-making process. The argument here was that this type of
voting data could be utilised in other ways than those paths already investigated in the literature.
This motivation is evident in all the four papers and is in line with motivation 3 above. Paper 1
also rests upon motivation 1 and 2. Heisenberg (2005) portrays the consensual decision mode
of the Council as if it were at odds with rational choice explanations. Paper 1 illustrates that this
is not the case and contributes to solving this “controversy” in the literature. The analysis in this
paper also shows that the two different data sources on conﬂict within the Council (positional
data and voting records) are mutually compatible. Previously, these data sources have been
assumed to be similar. The empirical analysis shows that both sources grasp parts of the same
underlying topic. Studies that utilise one of these data sources can thus safely be compared to
studies using the other. Furthermore, Paper 4 applies theory designed for veto bargaining in
order to explain ﬁrst-reading non-agreement across the Council and the EP (under co-decision).
While veto bargaining theories have been extensively applied in the EU setting, previous studies
have not (1) applied these to explain this particular problem nor (2) directly tested expectations
generated by the assumption of incomplete information. This type of contribution is similar to
motivation 4.
Another main contribution to the literature is the rigorous data generation process and sub-
sequent robust data analyses. The papers in this thesis combine different data sources, generate
variables from different databases, update previously investigated variables, and test other op-
erationalisations of key indicators. The analyses have also strived to report the uncertainty
of the ﬁndings and to treat missing values adequately. The different research design choices
are thoroughly elaborated and explained in order to secure possible replicability of and future
extensions to the analyses.
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Suggestions for further research
The research presented in this thesis signposts several paths for future research. First, the se-
lection bias in Council voting data can be further explored in the framework of a simpliﬁed
selection model (Little and Rubin, 2002; Zhang and Wang, 2012). Second, more and newer
data can be added to the different analyses to investigate whether the main ﬁndings also hold
for larger data samples. For instance, the new and improved Council voting database to be re-
leased in 2014 can enhance the robustness of analyses utilising this data source.10 Third, the
analyses can be replicated with reﬁned measurement of substantial indicators. This is particu-
larly interesting for the implementation analysis. For instance, it is possible to investigate the
issue level rather than the proposal level (see König and Mäder (2013)). Fourth, incomplete
information models can be more extensively applied to the EU setting. The effect of learning
on the assumption of incomplete information, either throughout bargaining rounds or due to
repeated interaction, can be investigated more thoroughly in both large and small N-studies.
Finally, this research design or extensions to it can be applied to other decision-making bodies
at the national or international level.
10My Brussels interviews with the Council secretariat are the source of this information.
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Issue-speciﬁc policy positions and voting in
the Councili
Bjørn Høylandii and Vibeke Wøien Hanseniii
ABSTRACT
Politics in the Council is Janus-faced. There is bargaining with identiﬁable winners and losers,
yet the voting records show high levels of agreement. These two sides have almost exclu-
sively been studied in isolation even though standard theoretical models of voting typically
assume that actors’ behaviour is guided by their positions relative to the proposal and the sta-
tus quo. By combining positional data and voting data, we evaluate to what extent voting is
driven by salience-weighted issue-speciﬁc positions. Our results show that governments’ vot-
ing behaviour are guided by their issue-speciﬁc positions. The relationship between preference-
based positions and votes is stronger when we impute values for the missing positions in the
positional data. This illustrates the importance of cautious treatment of missing data in EU
decision-making.
Keywords: Council, European Union, Missing data, Preferences, Voting
iThis paper is accepted for publication in European Union Politics and is forthcoming in 2014. Earlier versions
of the paper were presented at the 2010 Democracy conference at the University of Oslo, at the 2010 ECPR
EU standing group conference in Porto and at the 2013 EUSA biannual conference in Baltimore. We thank the
participants, in particular Fabio Franchino, Scott Gates, Simon Hug, Monika Mühlböck, Daniel Naurin and several
anonymous reviewers for their useful comments. Parts of Høyland’s research on this project were funded by the
Norwegian Research Council under grant 4454/V10, Conceptualization and Measurement of Democracy. While
carrying out this research Høyland has been associated with the ESOP centre at the Department of Economics,
University of Oslo. ESOP is supported by the Research Council of Norway. Wøien Hansen’s research was funded
by the Research Programme on Democracy at the University of Oslo.
iiProfessor, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo. Email: bjorn.hoyland@stv.uio.no
iiiPhD candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo. Email: v.w.hansen@stv.uio.no
27
Voting in the Council is often described as consensual (Lewis, 2000; Heisenberg, 2005;
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006). Voting records were ﬁrst released in the 1990s and these
records revealed high levels of unanimous votes even in policy areas where a qualiﬁed majority
of the weighted votes would have sufﬁced (Mattila and Lane, 2001). The low level of public
contestation led Heisenberg (2005) to argue that the Council is “the institution of ’consensus’ in
the European Union”, a result of more than 40 years of negotiations among the same partners.
New Council members are immediately introduced to the norms governing this culture of con-
sensus. Because of the high frequency of meetings and negotiations, the trust among partners
is high and reputation matters a lot. This allows for a diffuse form of reciprocity where the dif-
ferent actors do not expect their needs to be immediately accommodated (Lewis, 2000, 2003).
Instead, the actors engage in repeated interactions that facilitate a stable norm of consensus.
Bargaining in the Council is, on the other hand, characterised by diverging interests and
continuous disagreements (Thomson et al., 2006; Thomson, 2011). There are winners and
losers in EU decision making. Analyses employing positional data show that some governments
manage to secure a policy outcome closer to their own preferences than others (Bailer, 2004;
Arregui and Thomson, 2009; Golub, 2012; Cross, 2013).
Hence, accounts of decision making in the Council may at ﬁrst sight seem contradictory.
Studies that rely on positional data emphasise bargaining (e.g. Thomson et al., 2006), while
studies that rely on voting records emphasise the consensual nature of Council decision making
(e.g. Heisenberg, 2005). The description of politics in the Council is thus dependent on which
part of the decision-making process we wish to investigate as well as the available data sources.
However, the different strands of the literature are compatible with each other. To account for
both the bargaining stage and the voting stage, we combine voting data and positional data in
order to test to what extent governments act in a utility maximizing manner when voting in the
Council. Although the Council has a preference for deciding by unanimity, opposing votes are
tabled. Governmental preferences on EU policies also differ from each other as revealed by
positional data based on expert interviews (Thomson et al., 2006). Linking the bargaining stage
with the voting stage can thus tell us whether the governments that are on the losing side of the
bargain follow up by voting against the proposal. If such a relationship between preference-
28
based positions and voting behaviour is established, this puts into question the notion that the
Council is "the institution of ’consensus’ in the European Union" (Heisenberg, 2005; Lewis,
2000). Instead, such a relationship would support the notion that we need to treat consensus as
a variable rather than a constant in our analysis of Council decision making (Schneider, 2008).
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we evaluate to what extent governments
base their voting decisions on a comparison between the old policy and the new policy, in line
with the logic of a simple spatial model. In order to do this, we combine the positional data with
voting data. The results show that there is a relationship between preference-based positions and
voting behaviour. A government that prefers the old policy over the new policy is more likely to
vote against the new policy than a government that prefers the new policy over the old. Second,
we show that different treatments of missing data in the positional data set have an effect on
the main results. This relationship is stronger when we account for the missing values in the
positional data set. Appropriate treatment of missing data is important for this type of analysis.
Our paper is organised as follows. The next section relates our paper to the existing large-
N literature on Council decision making. There is a substantial literature on this matter. The
common denominator in most of this literature is the assumption that Council members are
rational actors (Mattila, 2004; Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins, 2005; Mattila, 2009; Thomson,
2009a).
The second section presents a simple theoretical account of voting in the Council. The
purpose of this section is to explain why we may see such a high level of consensus if minsters
simply vote in line with their issue-speciﬁc positions. We note that only successful legislation
is recorded in the Council minutes concerning the (ﬁnal) adoption of legal acts.1 Cases where
opposition actually has blocked the legislation at earlier stages in the decision making are not a
part of our data set. Ofﬁcial voting records of adopted legislation thus under-report the actual
aggregate level of disagreement in the Council.
The third section speciﬁes the statistical model and the data we rely on for our investigation
of Council voting. We combine positional data (Thomson et al., 2006) with voting records from
the ofﬁcial minutes (Hagemann and Høyland, 2008), and employ a hierarchical probit model of
1see http://consilium.europa.eu/documents/legislative-transparency/council-minutes.
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voting in the statistical analysis. The fourth section presents our results. The main result is that
governments vote in line with their issue-speciﬁc positions. This ﬁnding is stronger when we
impute the missing values in the positional data set. In the concluding section, we discuss the
implications of our ﬁndings for research on legislative politics in the EU.
RESEARCH ON COUNCIL DECISION MAKING
Research on voting in the Council has made substantive progress over the last decade. This is
partly due to increased data availability. While earlier research had to rely on insiders’ accounts
and more indirect measures, the push towards transparency in EU affairs following the Ams-
terdam treaty has dramatically increased the accessibility of data on Council decision making
(which can be illustrated by the difference in the amount of data reported in Hayes-Renshaw
and Wallace (1997) and Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006)).
There are two strands of studies in the quantitative literature on Council decision making that
focus on the relationship between the Council members, i.e. the representatives of the member
state governments. The ﬁrst strand uses voting data, while the second uses positional data. Both
strands seek to determine the spatial distances between the different Council members and to
map which members have similar interests in the Council policy space. Both strands also share
the same underlying theoretical assumption; Council members act in line with instrumental
rationality and thus are assumed to behave in accordance with their preferences and beliefs.
Actor alignment in the Council is a product of preferences and voting behaviour (e.g. Mattila,
2004; Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins, 2005; Mattila, 2009; Thomson, 2009a). Bargaining
success is more likely if an actor has less extreme preferences on issues that are salient to the
actor (e.g. Golub, 2012; Cross, 2013).
Both strands employ splits in preferences or votes to uncover which policy dimensions are
visible in Council decision making. A left-right dimension, a pro-anti integration dimension,
a small versus big countries dimension, a north-south dimension, and an old versus new mem-
ber states dimension are the most commonly detected dimensions (Mattila, 2004; Heisenberg,
2005; Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins, 2005; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006; Hagemann,
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2007; Hagemann and Høyland, 2008; Mattila, 2009; Thomson, 2009a). Even so, there are dis-
agreements between the two different strands on the strength of the ﬁndings and whether the
identiﬁed structural dimensions are stable over time. Thomson, Boereﬁjn and Stokman (2004)
emphasise the lack of structure in the positions of the actors. In their analysis of EU15, they
only ﬁnd weak evidence of a north-south dimension and a dimension where the EP and the
Commission prefer more policy changes than the member states. Based on the same positional
data source, Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins (2005) ﬁnd stronger evidence for a north-south
dimension than Thomson, Boereﬁjn and Stokman (2004). Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins
(2005) relabel this dimension as re-distributive, a conﬂict between the net-contributors and the
net-beneﬁciaries of the EU budget. The left-right dimension is, however, only weakly sup-
ported by this study. The two studies differ in the choice of statistical model and somewhat
in their treatment of missing data. Thomson, Boereﬁjn and Stokman (2004) use multidimen-
sional scaling while Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins (2005) employ correspondence analysis.
Both studies use some sort of mean-replacement of missing values but Zimmer, Schneider and
Dobbins (2005) also delete issues with more than four missing positions.
Studies based on voting records (Mattila, 2004; Hagemann and Høyland, 2008) ﬁnd more
support for the left-right dimension and the pro-anti integration dimension than studies based
on positional data. The importance of the ideological left-right alignment in the Council is
illustrated by the fact that new governments seem to prefer different coalition partners to their
predecessors (Hagemann and Høyland, 2008). After the eastern enlargement in 2004, a new-
old alignment has been detected in both preferences and voting behaviour (Thomson, 2009a;
Mattila, 2009). Although this type of dimension is identiﬁed in both strands of the literature, the
differences between the new and old member states are not strongly supported by the available
data.
The existing literature thus exploits the observable disagreements in Council decision mak-
ing. However, these studies do not test whether the sources of disagreement in the two different
data sources are interlinked. Similarities in the ﬁndings suggest that they are. However, a gov-
ernment may choose to vote yes despite preferring the status quo to the new policy. There are
several possible explanations for such voting behaviour. Knowing that it will be outvoted, a
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government may simply accept its loss quietly and hope that the loss will be compensated in
future negotiations. König and Junge (2009) show that compensations in the sense of logrolling
are a plausible explanation for the observed consensus in the Council. Governments can trade
off utility across proposals that belong to the same policy area or proposals that are negotiated
during the same time period. Choosing to be on the winning side of a vote may also be a
government strategy in order to avoid unwanted attention from the media or the opposition at
home.
Furthermore, the Commission preselects the proposals that the current conﬁguration of
Council members is most likely to adopt. Proposals that are likely to be contested by a major-
ity of the Council members or by a majority of the members of the European Parliament (EP)
are less likely to be initiated by the Commission. However, it does not have perfect informa-
tion with regard to the distribution of preferences in the Council and the EP. The Commission
thus has to withdraw proposals that fail to ﬁnd sufﬁcient support in the Council and the EP
(Kreppel, 1999; Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999). The Commission may of course also withdraw
proposals due to other reasons than disagreement in the Council and the EP. The percentage of
withdrawals is around 8 percent for the time span between 1976 and 2007 (Häge, 2011a). It is
not unlikely that member states’ voting behaviour on adopted legislation is different from their
behaviour on non-adopted legislation. In fact, legislation only reaches the ﬁnal stage if most of
the conﬂict has already been solved (Mühlböck, 2011). Only ﬁnal voting on adopted legisla-
tion is fully recorded in the minutes and the monthly summaries for the time frame considered
in this paper.2 Data on implicit voting at earlier stages in the process (at the working group
level or the ministerial level) is not usually publicly available (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace,
2006, 286). At the ministerial level, the Council presidency keeps track of the Council mem-
bers positions’ and tries to strike a compromise. If a compromise is not reached, the proposal
is referred back to the working group level and the informal voting result will not be recorded
in the minutes (Mühlböck, 2011). Hence, our ﬁndings cannot say anything about the overall
level of disagreement in the Council. However, the data may tell us whether the Council mem-
bers are utility-maximizing agents that act in line with their positions on adopted legislation.
2The Council secretariat notes that the public votes database from 2006 and onwards is considered to have
complete data on both ﬁnal voting and voting on the common position under co-decision.
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Our study departs from the previous ones in four explicit ways. First, we investigate explic-
itly whether there is a relationship between preference-based positions and voting behaviour.
Second, we test whether the importance that a Council member attaches to the different issues
of a proposal strengthens the relationship between (issue-speciﬁc) positions and votes. Third,
we address whether different treatments of missing values in the positional data have an effect
on the relationship between positions and votes. Fourth, by including negative statements in
the no vote category we have more variation in our dependent variable (Council member vote
choice) than König and Junge (2008, 2009) have when they compare predicted voting behaviour
with observed voting behaviour. Coding negative statements as negative votes is not an uncom-
mon choice in the Council voting literature (see Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse (2007) and
Hagemann and Høyland (2008)). Issuing a negative statement is also a type of behaviour that
signals a government’s opposition towards the adopted policy. As a robustness check, we run
the models without statements as a part of the dependent variable. The results are robust across
all models.
A SIMPLE THEORY OF VOTING IN THE COUNCIL
The underlying premise of the rational choice based literature on decision making in the Council
is that governments have preferences over policies, and act with the aim of moving policies
closer to their most preferred policy-outcome (ideal-point) or to prevent policies that are further
away from their ideal-point than the current policy (the status quo) from being adopted. Non-
cooperative game theoretic models of decision making in the EU have established the beneﬁts
of being agenda setters and veto players and the location of the decision outcome vis-a-vis
the different actors under the different legislative procedures (Steunenberg, 1994; Tsebelis and
Garrett, 1996; Crombez, 1996; Moser, 1996; Scully, 1997; Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000). Our
theoretical approach builds upon this literature. However, rather than determining where on a
dimension between the status quo and the Commission proposal a decision outcome is located
under a given legislative procedure, we elaborate on when government i is more likely than not
to record its opposition when voting on a legislative proposal.
33
If we assume that governments are sincere in their voting behaviour, and their utility-
function is a symmetric loss-function around their ideal-point, we would then expect govern-
ment i to support a new proposal if the utility of the new proposal is higher than the utility of
the status quo.3 Assuming that the new proposal lies to the right (left) of government i and the
status quo to the left (right), government i will only support the new proposal if the distance
between its ideal-point and the new proposal is smaller than the distance between its ideal point
and the status quo. In other words, the midpoint between the new proposal and the status quo
must be to the left (right) of the ideal point of government i. Assume that the Council has X
governments and the voting rule requires that x˜ members need to support a proposal in order for
it to be adopted. Only policies with midpoints located below the ideal point of government x
¯
or
above the ideal point of government x¯ can be adopted, any policy whose midpoint lies between
x
¯
and x¯ will not be supported by the necessary majority of governments see Figure 1.
Location of midpoint between proposal and SQ
x x
adopted adopted
not adopted
Figure 1: Cut-point ﬁgure. Any proposal whose midpoint is between x
¯
and x¯ will not be
adopted. For policy-moves to the right (left) the midpoint between the status quo and the pro-
posal has to be to the left (right) of x
¯
(x¯).
Furthermore, we will not observe any successful vote on proposals whose midpoint is lo-
cated inside the interval between government x
¯
and x¯. If any such policy is proposed, it will not
be adopted. If proposals are multidimensional, governments can trade gains on one dimension
(issue) against loss on another. Governments may attach different salience to each dimension
3The assumption that voting behaviour is sincere can be discussed. Since we lack data on disagreement in the
early stages of bargaining, the direct link between preferences and votes is not clear cut. However, to simplify the
model we assume that voting behaviour is sincere.
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(issue). Government i may hence compare the (salience-weighted) utility of a new proposal
with the (salience-weighted) utility of the status quo, and cast a vote for the alternative that it
prefers the most.
If positions and the salience that governments attach to the different dimensions are known,
proposals that lack sufﬁcient support will not be adopted, and any opposition recorded in the
ﬁnal minutes will not be able to prevent the adoption of a proposal. This may lead us to ques-
tion why governments bother to record their opposition. By so doing, their only achievement
is to demonstrate that they failed to prevent a proposal that they initially were against, from be-
ing adopted. However, as voting in this case is inconsequential, there are no strong theoretical
reasons to expect governments opposed to the new proposal to refrain from opposing either.
Furthermore, if there is some uncertainty regarding the positions of other governments and/or
the salience these governments attach to their positions, voting in line with their own prefer-
ences can never be worse, and may sometimes be better, than always supporting the majority
position. One reason for such behaviour may be to signal their position to outside actors, e.g. the
European Parliament or the Commission, or to domestic constituencies and political opponents.
Uncertainty about the voting decisions of other ministers may lead indifferent governments to
prefer the status quo to the new proposal. They may thus realise that there is actually a chance
of blocking the legislation, and thereby risk a potential loss by not voting against it.
Hence, member states vote in line with their (salience-weighted) issue-speciﬁc positions as
they can never be worse off and will sometimes be better off by voting in such a manner:
H1 Governments vote in line with their (salience-weighted) positions.
In the statistical analysis we thus expect to see that a positive utility of a proposal correlates
with a positive vote while a negative utility of a proposal correlates with a negative vote. In
other words, negative utility of a proposal should decrease the probability of voting in favour of
this particular proposal.
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METHOD AND DATA
We combine positional data with corresponding voting data from the minutes of meetings in
the Council in order to investigate whether issue-speciﬁc utility guides voting behaviour. We
adopt a simple approach to exploring this relationship and do not control for other variables that
may affect voting behaviour and thus remedy the effect of issue-speciﬁc utility. Including other
independent variables in our model may distort the simplicity of our argument and can open
up a range of additional selection issues. For example, controlling for the presidency would
distort the effect of issue-speciﬁc positions if such positions also inﬂuenced which proposals the
presidency put on the agenda. Also, whether an issue is decided as an A or B item may also be a
function of the issue-speciﬁc positions of the governments. By keeping the statistical model as
simple as possible, it is also applicable to similar contexts beyond the EU. Omitting EU-speciﬁc
variables ensures that our ﬁndings also can be relevant for other consensual decision-making
settings, for instance the World Trade Organization, the United Nations Security Council and
the World Bank.
The ﬁrst data set, “Decision Making in the European Union” (DEU), consists of member
states’ policy positions on 174 controversial issues raised in 70 legislative proposals initiated
by the Commission (Thomson et al., 2006). The information was collected through interviews
with 125 experts. The legislative proposals were subjected to either the consultation procedure
or the co-decision procedure. The proposals were introduced either during or before December
2000, and were on the agenda in 1999 or 2000. The Commission, the European Parliament
and the 15 member states were assigned positions. The positions on each issue were estimated
along a standardised policy scale with values between 0 and 100. The numerical differences
between the actors reﬂect the political distance between them (Thomson and Stokman, 2003).
The reference point (similar to the concept of status quo), the decision outcome of each issue,
and the level of salience that each actor attached to each issue were also deﬁned along this
continuum. With regard to salience, a score of 0 indicates that the issue was of no importance
while a score of 100 indicates that the issue could hardly be more important. If governments
vary in the salience they attach to the different issues, failure to take this into account may
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bias the results (Aksoy, 2012; Golub, 2012; Cross, 2013). Warntjen (2012) compares salience
measures provided by text analysis and media coverage with expert interviews and argues that
the latter may provide a more ﬁne-grained and less ambiguous measure of salience.
The second data set contains the formal voting decisions and formal statements recorded
in the Council minutes. The voting data are coded as binary decisions, and under qualiﬁed
majority voting (QMV) both abstentions, negative votes and formal statements are coded as no
votes in line with Hagemann and Høyland (2008). In practice, abstentions have the same effect
as no votes under QMV. Statements are included in the no votes group because these statements
often consist of direct disagreement or serious concerns with regard to a proposal, and may be
used to signal that the representative has stressed her position on a piece of legislation but was
reluctant to take a more drastic step and prevent consensus (Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse,
2007; Hagemann, 2008). Formal statements are made following the adoption of a proposal and
are included in the Council minutes or posted on the Council website. In the data set negative
votes are coded as 0 and yes votes as 1.
dissent ﬁnal dissent all with statements ﬁnal with statements all
Austria 2 2 2 2
Belgium 3 3 3 3
Denmark 1 1 2 2
Finland 0 0 2 2
France 1 1 2 2
Germany 2 2 2 2
Greece 1 1 3 3
Ireland 0 0 0 0
Italy 0 0 3 3
Luxembourg 2 3 2 3
Netherlands 3 4 4 5
Portugal 2 2 5 5
Spain 3 4 4 5
Sweden 0 0 1 1
UK 3 3 3 3
Total 23 26 38 41
Table 1: Negative votes and negative votes and statements for the 46 proposals in the Council
minutes with and without any additional non-ﬁnal votes.
One objection to the choice of including negative statements in the negative votes category is
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that this type of disagreement may already be captured by the position-based variable. However,
since issuing a statement is a distinct type of behaviour that departs from complete endorsement
of the adopted proposal, we argue that acting upon a preference-based position can be done in
the form of voting no, abstaining, or making a negative statement. Furthermore, interview data
reveals that the increased usage of formal statements is a way of showing disagreement without
creating gridlock (Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse, 2007). To make sure that our ﬁndings are
not a result of this particular choice of coding scheme, we run our models both with and without
negative statements. Table 1 shows the frequencies of negative votes across the member states.
Columns 3 and 4 include negative statements while columns 2 and 4 also include any additional
negative votes retrieved from, if applicable, the non-ﬁnal voting stage under the ﬁrst reading
of the co-decision procedure.4 All four variations of our dependent variable are tested in the
statistical analysis.
Dissent in published Council votes is rare. On the 46 pieces of legislation, that we were able
to identify in the Council minutes that matched exactly with the DEU data set, there were only
38 dissents in total (numbers from column 3 which includes negative statements). The number
of negative votes on any particular legislation ranged from 0 to 5. From these votes, Portugal
opposed 5 times while Ireland always voted in favour of the proposal. The choice of including
negative statements increases the mean of dissents from 0.5 to 0.8 (columns 1 and 3) or from
0.57 to 0.89 if we take all negative votes into account (columns 2 and 4).
In the positional data set, the locations of the reference points (the policy that will prevail
if no agreement can be reached) and the decision outcomes (the new policies) are used to de-
termine member state loss and gain with respect to their position on each issue. The reference
point bears a close resemblance to the status quo concept, although differs from the normal
usage in the sense that for some proposals, a no agreement situation will lead to a breakdown of
the existing arrangement (status quo) rather than the continuation of this arrangement (Thom-
son et al., 2006). 46 out of 70 policy proposals are listed in the Council minutes as concerning
the ﬁnal adoption of legal acts. These 46 proposals had 118 issues. Information in the Coun-
4The non-ﬁnal voting stage (the adoption of the common position in the Council) of the co-decision pro-
cedure is only applicable to the co-decision proposals that were adopted at later stages than the ﬁrst read-
ing. The votes on the common positions are retrieved from the Monthly summaries of Council acts, see
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/documents/legislative-transparency/.
38
cil minutes on the adoption of legal acts is missing for the remaining 56 issues nested in 24
policy proposals. Some information on these 24 proposals can be retrieved from the monthly
summaries of Council acts (i.e. adoption date, voting rule, and whether the proposals were
adopted with or without EP amendments in any second reading under co-decision). However,
for reasons of data consistency we only employ the proposals listed in the Council minutes in
our analysis.
missing positions missing saliency
Austria 16 7
Belgium 8 0
Denmark 8 3
Finland 10 3
France 3 1
Germany 3 0
Greece 11 5
Ireland 8 1
Italy 5 1
Luxembourg 20 11
Netherlands 7 1
Portugal 7 1
Spain 4 0
Sweden 8 0
UK 4 1
Total 122 35
Table 2: Missing data on 118 issues in the DEU data: Positions and salience.
With regard to the extent of missing values in the DEU data (Thomson et al., 2006), Table
2 provides an overview of missing information on issue-speciﬁc positions and issue-speciﬁc
salience estimates for the 46 proposals in our data set. Of the 118 issues, the positions of
Luxembourg and Austria are missing on 20 and 16 issues, respectively. The interviewers also
did not obtain the salience measure on 11 issues in the case of Luxembourg and 7 issues in
the case of Austria. These two member states are thus the ones with most missing values in
the DEU data set. In total 122 out of 1770 issue positions are missing, or about 6.9 percent.
While this level of missingness is not exceptionally large by political science standards, it is not
ignorable. Researchers relying on this data set therefore need to make some decisions on how
to address this issue before proceeding with the analysis. Some of the chosen approaches are
39
summarised in Table 3. Note, that the different choices of the previous studies are contextual.
Some studies need complete positional data to investigate their research question, while others
do not.
The most common approach when working with the DEU data set, taken for example by
Selck and Steunenberg (2004) and Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins (2005), is to delete issues
if there are missing values on more than four member state positions. The remaining missing
values are then replaced by either the position of the Commission or the mean score between the
reference point and the Commission’s position. The underlying assumption here is that member
states that were not assigned a position during the expert interviews were neutral actors on these
issues. While a mean/ﬁxed value replacement approach is not uncommon when dealing with
missing data, it has been criticised by statisticians (Little, 1992) and political methodologists
(Honaker and King, 2010) alike. The key criticism with this approach is that it ignores the
uncertainty by treating unknown data as if it is known.
The other alternatives to handling missing data are list-wise deletion or some multiple im-
putation technique. König, Finke and Daimer (2005) advocate the use of multiple imputation
as being far better than list-wise deletion when handling missing positions, and subsequently
test different ways of imputing missing actor positions. This study employs collected informa-
tion on the positions of the actors involved in EU constitution building (DOSEI project) and
includes several data sources including the DEU data set. The analysis identiﬁes a selection
bias. Actors strategically hide their positions when they expect to receive more concessions.
This ﬁnding indicates that missing values are more extreme than the observed values. Actors
without positions hide their positions for strategic purposes (König, Finke and Daimer, 2005).
It is therefore debatable whether missing positions are extreme or neutral.
Arregui and Thomson (2009) show that large member states have fewer missing positions
than small member states in the DEU data set. They argue that this is due to the small member
states being indifferent to more issues than large member states, as they are affected by fewer
issues. Furthermore, some missing positions can be explained by the lack of relevance of a
particular issue for the actors in question (Thomson, 2011). While there are good reasons for
considering missing positions as neutral positions, we can never be sure that actors with missing
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study missing treatment
Selck and Steunenberg (2004) missing replaced with Commission position
list-wise deletion ≥ 5 missing positions
Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins (2005) missing replaced by mean score between
reference point and Commission position
list-wise deletion ≥ 5 missing positions
König, Finke and Daimer (2005) 3 different measures:
1)multiple imputation (Amelia)
2) measure of indifference
3) conditional averaging algorithm
König and Junge (2008, 2009) multiple imputation (Amelia)
Thomson (2011) mean average of all positions
Table 3: Treatment of missing values in positional data across studies.
positions are in fact indifferent to these issues. Missing positions in the DEU data can also be
due to the policy experts not remembering the actual positions of certain actors (Thomson et al.,
2006). Hence, multiple imputation, which takes the uncertainty of missing data into account,
may be a better alternative than replacing missing values with the mean or some other ﬁxed
value (i.e. the position of the Commission). However, Thomson (2011, 42) argues that multi-
ple imputation is inappropriate due to the large variation in actors’ positions across issues, and
resorts to mean-replacement or list-wise deletion in his study. This criticism would hold if we
impute one actor’s missing positions on the basis of this actor’s positions on other issues. Our
approach to missing data is similar to that of König, Finke and Daimer (2005) in that, unlike
mean-replacement, it takes the associated uncertainty into account. However, it differs with re-
gards to how it is implemented. The standard multiple imputation approach uses the variables in
the data set. In the case of König, Finke and Daimer (2005), it is augmented by additional infor-
mation from extant data. The method ﬁlls in estimated values for missing data in multiple data
sets prior to the analysis stage and assumes that the data are distributed multivariate normal. If
the data are categorical, they are recoded into appropriate categories (for a critique and an alter-
native approach, see Cranmer and Gill, 2013). It then runs an analysis on each individual data
set and reports the average effect and standard error. In contrast, the Bayesian approach treats
missing data as parameters to be estimated alongside the other parameters in the model. The
only assumption we make is that missing positions and salience data are uniformly distributed
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between 0 and 1.5 Following this, for each iteration of the Monte Carlo Markov chain, the val-
ues of all parameters are updated conditional on the existing data, and the parameter estimate
of the missing data and on other parameters of the model (for an introduction to missing data
imputation in the Bayesian framework, see Gelman and Hill, 2007, 529 - 543).
Only if data are missing completely at random (MCAR) is it safe to use list-wise deletion.
Missing completely at random means that ’none of the data collected or missing are relevant
for explaining the chance of missingness’ (Congdon, 2005, 380). In most cases, that is a fairly
strong assumption. List-wise deletion, the default in most statistical software, implies that all
rows with missing data are deleted from the data set. The best indication that this approach is
taken is a varying number of cases across different model speciﬁcations.6 One can also critique
the other popular method of replacing missing data with the mean or some other typical value.
This approach is motivated by the interest of preserving all the cells in the data set. Proponents
of this approach argue that it is conservative as it should increase the likelihood of ﬁnding
insigniﬁcant results. However, by replacing the missing value with a single value, which is
unlikely to be correct, the level of uncertainty regarding the actual value is underestimated.
Biased results may thus follow. In the frequentist framework, multiple imputation (i.e. as
implemented by the Amelia missing data program) is an appropriate approach (Honaker and
King, 2010; King, Honaker, Joseph and Scheve, 2001; König, Finke and Daimer, 2005), given
that data are missing at random (MAR), meaning that missing values on one variable can be
predicted from the values on the other variables. In the Bayesian approach, missing values are
predicted from the values on the other variables and the prior distributions on an iteration by
iteration basis. If some of the predictors have missing values, it is sufﬁcient to assume a prior
distribution for the predictor in order to impute values.
The requirement is that the MAR assumption holds. However, if missing data are not ignor-
able and are not missing at random (NMAR), it is necessary to model the process that generates
missingness in order for data to become MAR. The key is to model the process that governs
5We rescale positions and salience estimates by dividing by 100, see the Statistical models section. Hence, we
assume that the missing values are also distributed between 0 and 1. The original distribution of the measures is
between 0 and 100 as mentioned before.
6In our positional data set that can be matched with the Council minutes, list-wise deletion reduces the number
of rows in the data set from 118 to 56. Only 0.47 of the original data set remains for analysis after the list-wise
deletion.
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whether data are observed or missing. There are two main approaches, either by using auxiliary
variables to model the missing-generating process, or by relying on a simpliﬁed selection model
(Little and Rubin, 2002). It may, however, be difﬁcult to justify the model for missingness, or
collect the auxiliary variables needed to model it properly. Consequently, we do not attempt to
model the latter process (NMAR) in this paper. Instead we investigate whether the choice of
missing data treatment has an effect on the main results. We thus compare models where issues
with more than four missing member state positions are deleted and the remaining missing posi-
tions are assigned a neutral position with models employing the Bayesian imputation of missing
values. The underlying assumption of the latter framework is that data are missing at random
(MAR), i.e. random after controlling for the co-variate. By estimating the value multiple times,
a random element ensures that the values vary across the data set, thereby ensuring that imputed
observations have more uncertainty than the observed observations. We use the Bayesian ap-
proach assuming that missing data are drawn from a known distribution or explicitly modelled.
Missing values on the dependent variable are imputed iteratively on the basis of the predictors
in the model, while missing data in the predictors must be modeled explicitly. The latter is com-
monly achieved by simply assuming a prior distribution of the predictor. The main advantage
of the Bayesian approach for our problem is the ﬂexibility it allows in the modeling of missing
data. Furthermore, it is also easier to handle multiple, and a varying number of, issues per vote
in this framework. Next we elaborate on our choice of statistical model and our treatment of
missing values in the positional data.
Statistical models
We model vote choice as an absolute loss function of the salience-weighted issue-speciﬁc utility
of the outcome compared to the reference point (rp):
y∗(i,k) = β1 + β2 ∗ utility(i,k)
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where β is distributed multivariate normal, with prior mean 0 and precision .001.
utility(i,k) = ||(salience(i,j)∗(position(i,j)−rpj))||−||(salience(i,j)∗(position(i,j)−outcomej))||
We run two series of models:
1. The baseline model replaces missing positions with the mean score between the Com-
mission and the reference point if less than ﬁve positions are missing, list-wise deletion
otherwise. No imputation of missing reference points.
2. The full imputation model imputes missing positions and missing reference points.
Both types of models are run with and without salience-weights and with and without for-
mal statements as a part of our dependent variable (vote choice). The relationship that we are
interested in testing is the one between salience-weighted issue-positions and voting behaviour.
As there may be multiple contested issues on a given piece of legislation, but only the opportu-
nity to support or oppose the legislation as a whole, we use the mean of the salience-weighted
change in utility across the issues mentioned on each piece of legislation. The change in utility
is calculated by subtracting the absolute difference between the position of government i and the
new policy from the absolute difference between the position of government i and the reference
point.7 This difference is then multiplied by the salience government i attached to the issue. For
each piece of legislation, we calculate the mean of these salience-weighted differences. Both
the positions, including the reference point and the new policy, and the salience estimates are
divided by 100, thereby making the values range from 0 to 1.
Failure to properly account for the missingness in the positional data may seriously bias
the results.8 We contrast the standard approach to modeling missing values in the DEU data
(Selck and Steunenberg, 2004; Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins, 2005), i.e. a combination of
7It is possible to employ other measures of issue level utility (i.e. a city block measure or weighted Euclidean
distances) than the measures employed here. These measures are more complex than the chosen mean approach.
Given the limited number of proposals in our data set, we will leave the exploration of other utility measures to
further research.
8When employing the conservative measure (without formal statements as part of the no category) of our depen-
dent variable vote choice, three proposals have missing positions and/or salience estimates for one or more mem-
ber state(s) that engaged in negative voting behaviour on these particular proposals. These cases (CNS/1998/347,
COD/1999/244, and CNS/1996/115) illustrate why it is feasible to model missing values explicitly.
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list-wise deletion and mean-replacement, with a multiple imputation approach. Issues where
the reference point is missing are usually deleted in the previous studies. The reason for doing
this is that one cannot assume that the reference point location of one proposal is determined
by that of other proposals (König and Junge, 2008, 2009). However, it is possible to impute the
reference point on basis of the possible distribution of positions (0-100) within an issue. The full
imputation model implements such an approach while the baseline model deletes issues where
the reference point is missing. Several objections to the imputation of missing reference points
can be raised. Missing reference points may, for instance, be due to the fact that existing national
policies vary across member states. Hence, it is difﬁcult to determine what the actual reference
point will be if the legislation fails. This uncertainty is, however, partly accounted for by the
multiple imputation framework. Achen (2006) shows that the reference point is less inﬂuential
than the procedural modelling tradition implies that it is. The reference point plays only a
minor role in the negotiations if the decision outcome is far away from the reference point. The
location of the decision outcome can thus be said to be more important when determining the
utility loss of a government than the location of the reference point. Hence, we will argue that
imputing reference points are acceptable as long as we have the location of the decision outcome
on each issue. Note that our baseline model does not impute any missing reference points and
thus serves as a robustness check. All models are estimated using the Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) simulation. We ran 150 000 iterations, discarding the ﬁrst 50 000. Standard
convergence statistics indicate that all models had converged on the target distribution.
RESULTS
The results need to be interpreted in light of the case selection. Only controversial proposals are
included in the DEU data sample (Thomson et al., 2006). The case selection could potentially
bias the results. However, since the variation in preference distribution is likely to be greater
when bargaining on a controversial proposal and such a proposal cannot be adopted without the
support of most (or all) of the governments, this bias is likely to be a conservative one. An anal-
ysis using less controversial proposals may ﬁnd a stronger relationship between positions and
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votes. Accordingly, the negotiations on uncontroversial proposals may result in fewer policy
losers and thus more policy winners than the negotiations on controversial proposals.
Tables 4 and 5 present the results. The main ﬁnding is that issue-speciﬁc positions can
account for the variation in voting patterns that we observe in the Council. We ﬁnd support
for the main hypothesis advanced in this paper [H1]. The effect of utility on voting is positive
and robust across all models regardless of missing treatment, coding scheme of the dependent
variable, and salience-weighting of the positions. In Tables 4 and 5, the effect of utility is
distinguishable from zero in all models. The 95 percent credibility interval does accordingly
not overlap zero.
The effect of issue-speciﬁc positions is substantively larger in the models that impute all
missing values than in the baseline models. This suggests that standard approaches to studying
decision making in the Council may not capture the full effect of preference-based positions, in
particular if the problem of missing data is ignored. When the baseline approach to modeling
missing data is employed, only 68 percent of the data set remains after deleting issues with
missing reference points and/or more than four missing member state positions. Hence, the
full imputation approach ensures more data while at the same time taking the uncertainty of
the distribution of missing values into account. This results in a stronger relationship between
positions and votes.
Baseline Full imputation
Constant Positions Constant Positions
Final round votes 1.811 0.624 1.791 0.894
(0.098) (0.207) (0.096) (0.278)
All round votes 1.748 0.606 1.731 0.918
(0.093) (0.2) (0.091) (0.269)
Final round votes and statements 1.748 0.606 1.543 0.568
(0.094) (0.202) (0.08) (0.223)
All rounds votes and statements 1.512 0.389 1.503 0.601
(0.079) (0.167) (0.079) (0.221)
Number of proposals 44 (80 issues) 46 (118 issues)
Table 4: Baseline and full imputation models: Effect of positions on voting
We will now discuss the estimates in more detail before moving on to the substantive ef-
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Baseline Full imputation
Constant Positions Constant Positions
Final round votes 1.826 1.067 1.823 1.879
(0.098) (0.326) (0.1) (0.476)
All round votes 1.762 1.017 1.761 1.902
(0.094) (0.317) (0.095) (0.46)
Final round votes and statements 1.764 1.014 1.552 1.268
(0.094) (0.316) (0.08) (0.389)
All rounds votes and statements 1.521 0.687 1.51 1.324
(0.079) (0.27) (0.079) (0.385)
Number of proposals 44 (80 issues) 46 (118 issues)
Table 5: Baseline and full imputation models: Effect of salience-weighted positions on voting
fects. Tables 4 and 5 compare the results from four different model speciﬁcations with (salience-
weighted) issue-speciﬁc positions as a predictor for voting decisions under two alternative ap-
proaches to treatment of missing data; the baseline model (a combination of list-wise deletion
and mean/ﬁxed value replacement) and a full imputation model. The effect of positions is pos-
itive across all models. However, the effect is stronger in the full imputation models where
missing values are imputed on an iteration by iteration basis (which preserves the uncertainty)
than in the baseline models where observations with missing data are either excluded or re-
placed with the mean value between the reference point and the Commission (governments
with missing positions are hence assigned a neutral position). This shows that disregarding
missing positions may bias results (cf. König, Finke and Daimer, 2005). In this case, the choice
of non-imputation may underestimate the existence of preference-based voting in the Council.
The effect of positions on voting is almost consistently stronger when full imputation is applied.
The only exception is when the positions are not salience-weighted and the no vote category of
the dependent variable includes ﬁnal votes and statements (see the third row in Table 4). When
this coding scheme is applied, the choice of missing treatment is almost inconsequential.
While the choice of missing treatment has a substantial effect on the results, the different
coding schemes for the dependent variable vote choice matter less. For the baseline models,
the effect of utility is almost the same across all model speciﬁcations except when all possible
opposition is included in the no category of the dependent variable (all votes, including ﬁrst
round of co-decision and statements). In the full imputation models, the effect of utility on
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voting is somewhat greater when negative statements are not included in the no vote category
of the dependent variable. Even so, the effect is still stronger in the full imputation models
than in the baseline models (apart from the exception already mentioned above). Compared to
the baseline model, the effect doubles when positions are salience-weighted and all possible
variation is included the dependent variable (see the last row in Table 5). In the full imputation
models, the ﬁnding that the effect of positions on voting is stronger when statements are not
included in the dependent variable is interesting. A plausible explanation for this ﬁnding may
be that while government i votes down a proposal as a whole, it may issue a negative statement
directed toward a speciﬁc issue within a proposal. If the latter is the case, government i’s
mean position on all issues within a proposal can be positive, while the vote choice under this
particular coding scheme will be negative if it is issuing a negative statement on a particular
issue in a multi-issue proposal. Our results indicate that such a scenario occurs but that it does
not happen often enough to signiﬁcantly affect the results.
There is a substantial difference between the baseline models and the full imputation models
when we calculate the predicted probabilities to vote against or in favour of a proposal under
a given scenario. In the model where we only consider ﬁnal round votes, a government that
gains 75 points on the original 0-100 scale (.75 on our scale) by the new proposal will have a
predicted probability of voting in favour of .99 in the baseline model and .994 in the imputed
model. However, if the government stands to lose 75 points (.75 on our scale) the predicted
probability of voting in favour only drops to .91 in the baseline model, while it drops to .854
in the imputed model. The effects and the differences in effects are even larger when salience
is taken into account. Again, considering only ﬁnal round votes (not statements) the predicted
probability of voting in favour if the new proposal offered an improvement of 75 points (.75
on our scale) is .996 in the baseline model and .999 in the imputed model. By contrast, if the
new proposal makes a government 75 points worse off (.75 on our scale) the baseline model
has a predicted probability of .847 of voting in favour, while the imputed model has a predicted
probability of only .66. This shows that the failure to account for the generation of missing
positional data may lead to erroneous conclusions regarding the effect of issue positions on
voting behaviour. In this case, it seems like mean replacement actually under-estimates the
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Figure 2: The ﬁgure compares the predicted effect of relative position under mean replacement
(left) and imputation (right) for salience weighted (upper) and unweighted (lower) policy po-
sitions. The calculations are based on the models where the dependent variable is ﬁnal stage
voting (not statements).
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effect of positions on behaviour.
Figure 2 plots the effect of relative position on the probability of supporting the proposal.
The left side of the ﬁgure shows these effects when the baseline model applies. The right
side of the ﬁgure shows these effects when positions are imputed on an iteration by iteration
basis. The upper row shows results for salience-weighted positions, while the lower row shows
the results in the case where the positions are not weighted by salience. There are three key
insights. First, relative positions matter for observed voting in the Council. Second, the effect
is stronger when the models include salience. Third, the estimated effects are larger when
missing data are imputed. Nevertheless, a key feature of the ﬁgure is also the high predicted
probability of voting in favour of the proposal, regardless of the relative position, which serves
as a reminder that we only observe disagreement on adopted legislation. It is clear that the
governments, regardless of their issue-speciﬁc policy positions, have a higher probability of
voting yes than no. However, as already alluded to, our data set does not include any votes
on proposals where the Council fails to ﬁnd a qualiﬁed majority. In other words, the models
are only able to provide estimated probabilities that are conditional on the legislation actually
being adopted. Our research design thus limits the scope of research to the link between stated
preferences and actual observed voting. In order to understand the full effect of positions on
voting, we would need veriﬁable information about the location of any alternative proposals
that are considered during the legislative process.
CONCLUSION
We have investigated whether members of the Council vote in line with their salience-weighted
issue positions. Our results show that rational utility-maximizing behaviour can account for
the voting behaviour of the governments. In other words, preferences and voting behaviour
are connected to each other. Hence, rational choice explanations of Council decision making
are just as valid as consensus explanations. Although the outcome of bargaining tends to be
consensual, such an observation does not equal that governments vote against their preferences.
This is an interesting ﬁnding in itself which also may be applicable to other consensual decision-
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making bodies like the World Trade Organization, the United Nations Security Council and the
World Bank.
Preference-related voting behaviour may also be said to increase the democratic legitimacy
of EU decision making. It shows that bargaining does not fully erase the preferences of the
governments, and that governments seek to pursue the interests of their domestic constituen-
cies throughout the decision-making process. Showing that preferences are associated with
the voting stage is the ﬁrst contribution that our analysis makes to the existing literature. The
similarities in the ﬁndings between studies that employ voting data and studies that employ
preference-based data are thus validated by our analysis. The second contribution is that differ-
ent treatments of missing data have an effect on the main ﬁndings. The relationship between
preferences and votes is stronger when missing values in the positional data are imputed in
an iterated fashion. Furthermore, our ﬁndings also indicate that the salience attached to the
proposal by the individual governments matters for their voting behaviour. The relationship
between preferences and voting behaviour is stronger when we control for salience.
Recorded Council votes are neither in any meaningful sense a random sample nor do they
represent the universe of all decisions taken in the Council within the time-frame of the study.
Instead, they represent a biased selection, as only votes on legislation that are adopted enter into
the data set. This means that the observed consensus culture in the Council may be a product
of this selection bias. When opposition is successful, legislation will not be adopted. The
high level of consensus in the Council may also be a combination of the following: 1) mainly
uncontroversial legislation is adopted and 2) governments put forward a show of unity rather
than voting sincerely. A model that incorporates the selection bias may capture whether this is
actually the case.
While observers of voting in the Council are surely aware of the selection bias in the reported
votes, no one has explicitly modeled voting in the Council in a selection model framework. We
believe that future research can beneﬁt from incorporating selection aspects explicitly into the
analysis. This can be done by modeling the processes that determine whether data are observed
or missing (NMAR). Incorporating a simpliﬁed selection model into the statistical analyses
is an example of how this approach can be implemented (Little and Rubin, 2002). Such an
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approach requires that we have information on votes that were not taken because of the majority
requirement, or if taken, failed to meet this requirement. It would also be useful to supplement
voting data with indicators of dissent that are less prone to the same selection bias, for example
data on implementation of EU legislation (König and Luetgert, 2009; Luetgert and Dannwolf,
2009; Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied, 2009).
Selection bias is not conﬁned to Council voting; it may also affect research on roll call voting
in the EP (Carrubba, Gabel, Murrah, Clough, Montgomery and Schambach, 2006; Carrubba,
Gabel and Hug, 2008, 2009). Selection models could be incorporated into a general framework
in order to investigate the extent of the potential selection bias in EP roll call votes.
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According to the logic of standard veto bargaining models with complete information, bargain-
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tive procedure (co-decision). Even so, non-agreement at the ﬁrst reading occurs frequently in
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with incomplete information, two speciﬁc predictions with regard to the occurrence of ﬁrst-
reading non-agreements can be generated. First-reading agreements are less likely to occur (1)
the greater the distance between the ideal point of the Council and the ideal point of the Eu-
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The basic game-theoretic model of veto bargaining infers that when all actors are completely
informed about the preferences of the other players, vetoes should not occur. This is because
the agenda setter can choose to propose the policy closest to its own ideal point that will also be
approved by the veto player (Cameron and McCarty, 2004). According to this logic, bargaining
with the possibility of extending to more than one round would always be completed in the ﬁrst
round. The necessary assumption here is complete information. Studies on European Union
(EU) decision making usually assume that actors have complete information with regard to the
other actors’ positions in the bargaining (Tsebelis, 1994; Steunenberg, 1994; Crombez, 1996;
Moser, 1996; Scully, 1997; Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000; Crombez and Hix, 2013).
This assumption makes it easier to model the bargaining process, but nevertheless, some em-
pirics are contrary to it. According to the basic veto bargaining models, when the main decision
makers in the EU (the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament (EP)) have complete
information with regard to each other’s preferences on co-decision legislation, we should never
observe legislation that is adopted at later stages than the ﬁrst reading. This because a “no
agreement” under the ﬁrst reading is costly and can be prevented by striking a deal that suits the
conﬁguration of preferences within the Council and the EP. However, legislation is frequently
adopted at later stages than the ﬁrst reading. In the 5th and 6th European Parliaments (1999-
2009) 53 percent of the co-decision proposals were completed at the ﬁrst reading (Toshkov and
Rasmussen, 2012).
Hence, the assumption of complete information can be relaxed in the EU context. While
the Council presidency keeps track of the various Council members’ preferences on a particular
piece of legislation, the presidency is not necessarily informed of the exact preference distri-
bution in the EP. The same holds for the party group leaders within the European Parliament
(EP). They may have control over the preference conﬁguration within their own group but are
likely to be less informed on the preference conﬁguration within the Council and within other
party groups inside the EP. While the EP negotiates in public, Council debates are tradition-
ally conducted in a less transparent manner (Stasavage, 2004). This means that the Council
may know more about the EP than the EP knows about the Council. If preferences were com-
pletely known inside and across institutions, we would only observe ﬁrst-reading agreements as
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bargaining costs increase with the number of decision-making rounds. Nevertheless, empirics
show that agreement is reached at all stages in the co-decision procedure. Tsebelis and Garrett
(2000) argue that complete information only exists in the ﬁnal rounds of EU decision making.
By then the actors have had the opportunity to learn about each other in previous rounds of
bargaining.
This paper thus relaxes the assumption of complete information in EU bargaining in order
to explain incidences where ﬁrst-reading agreement cannot be reached across the institutions.
Drawing upon veto bargaining theory with incomplete information (Cameron and McCarty,
2004), two speciﬁc predictions regarding the occurrence of ﬁrst-reading non-agreement can be
generated. First-reading agreements are less likely to occur (1) the greater the distance between
the Council pivot and the median position of the European Parliament (EP) and (2) the greater
the salience attached to the proposal. Both expectations are tested by two different tests in this
paper. The ﬁrst test utilises positional data on 183 issues nested in 64 proposals adopted before
and after the 2004 enlargement (Thomson et al., 2006, 2012). The second test merges various
data sources at the proposal level in order to investigate whether the expectations also hold for
a larger data sample which includes other operationalisations of the substantial predictors and
important control variables (Häge, 2007, 2011a; König and Luig, 2012). Both tests ﬁnd robust
evidence for the empirical predictions generated from veto bargaining models with incomplete
information.
First-reading agreements are negatively associated with high salience and large differences
in preferences between the EP median and the Council pivot. Hence, while other studies on
early agreement in the EU emphasise the democratic drawbacks of this type of decision mak-
ing (e.g. Farrell and Heritier, 2003; Häge and Kaeding, 2007; Reh et al., 2013), this analysis
contributes to the positive aspect of the debate as highly salient and controversial cases are
associated with more transparent decision-making modes.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a brief litera-
ture review on early agreement and co-decision bargaining in the EU. The theoretical framework
based on veto bargaining under incomplete information is outlined in section 3. This framework
is based on Cameron and McCarty (2004). The data and method employed are addressed in sec-
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tion 4. The analysis utilises data from both the issue level and the proposal level and thus draws
upon a variety of data sources (Thomson et al., 2012; Häge, 2011a; König and Luig, 2012).
The results from the logistic regression analyses are presented in section 5. Both tests provide
robust support for the theoretical framework. The last section draws conclusions and discusses
the impact of the identiﬁed micro-level factors on bargaining and legislative agreement across
the EU institutions.
CO-DECISION BARGAINING AND EARLY AGREEMENTS IN THE EU
The co-decision procedure was introduced under the terms of the Maastricht Treaty (1992).
One of the main reasons for establishing this procedure was to empower the EP and hence to
increase the democratic legitimacy of the EU (Crombez, 1997). The reform of the co-decision
procedure by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 not only made the EP and the Council of Minis-
ters (hereafter the Council) coequal legislators, it also paved the way for early agreements in
the ﬁrst reading of the procedure (Farrell and Heritier, 2003). About one-third of all dossiers
decided under this legislative procedure in the ﬁfth term of the EP (1999-2004) were so-called
fast track legislation completed at the ﬁrst reading (Rasmussen, 2011). The growing number of
ﬁrst-reading agreements has spurred discussion on possible negative consequences on democ-
racy (Farrell and Heritier, 2003, 2004; Shackleton and Raunio, 2003). First-reading agreement
means that the Council and the EP have reached an informal compromise before the legislation
reaches the plenary stage in the EP at the ﬁrst reading stage. This informal process is called
“trialogues” since representatives from the three legislative institutions, the Commission, the
EP and the Council, are involved. Bargaining in trialogues has been criticised for lack of trans-
parency and for shutting minority interests out from the negotiating table (Farrell and Heritier,
2003; Häge and Naurin, 2013).
Despite this type of criticism, empirical studies investigating factors that determine early
agreements paint a mixed picture of the democratic consequences of fast-track legislation. On
the positive side for democratic legitimacy, early agreements are less likely to take place the
greater the distance between a rapporteur from a large party group and the EP median (Ras-
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mussen, 2011). Furthermore, the Council presidency cannot exploit informal negotiations in
trialogues in order to secure policy gains (Häge and Naurin, 2013; Reh et al., 2013). Policies
reached early on are no closer to the positions held by the main informal actors, the Council
presidency and the EP rapporteur’s party group, than policies reached at later stages (Rasmussen
and Reh, 2013). There is also evidence for the EP, under co-decision, having more inﬂuence
on early agreements than on agreements reached in the conciliation committee at the end of the
procedure (Häge and Kaeding, 2007). The logic behind this empirically supported theoretical
argument is that the Council prefers to conclude early over agreement in the conciliation com-
mittee, in which costs are greater for the Council than for the EP (due to the former’s limited
time and resources).
Although the above ﬁndings do mitigate the criticism of fast-track legislation to some extent,
several studies also ﬁnd negative consequences of early agreements on democracy. For instance,
when the legislative workload and the number of negotiators increase, decisions are more likely
to be taken at an early stage (Reh et al., 2013). While the efﬁciency gains of concluding early
are indisputable, the legislative transparency and minority legitimacy suffer. The democratic
accountability is also reduced due to the ministers being less involved in bargaining on fast-track
legislation than in bargaining at later stages of the co-decision procedure (Häge and Naurin,
2013). Instead, Council bureaucrats negotiate early agreements on behalf of the ministers.
This paper endeavours to contribute to this debate by particularly investigating the effects
of preference divergence and salience on early agreements. While preference divergence and
salience have been investigated thoroughly for other research questions related to EU bargaining
and decision making (e.g. Thomson et al., 2006; Häge, 2007; Schneider, Finke and Bailer,
2010; Thomson, 2011; Aksoy, 2012; Cross, 2013), the effects of these variables can be further
explored in the setting of early agreements.1 In terms of democratic accountability, it would
be preferable if highly salient and controversial cases were to be decided in a more transparent
way than informal bargaining in trialogues. Previous studies on fast-track legislation provide
some evidence that greater preference divergence reduces the probability of early agreements.
Rasmussen (2011) ﬁnds that greater distance between the EP rapporteur (who is in charge of
1Rasmussen and Reh (2013) also use salience-weighted positional data in their analysis but their dependent
variable is legislative bargaining success and not early agreement.
111
drafting the proposal content inside the EP) and the EP median on the left-right dimension
is negatively associated with early agreements. This ﬁnding is contingent on the rapporteur
stemming from one of the large party groups within the EP. Reh et al. (2013) show that greater
policy distance between the national political parties of the rapporteur and the presiding minister
of the responsible Council formation at the time of political agreement reduces the probability
of trialogue bargaining. This effect is small and only signiﬁcant at the ten percent level. Reh
et al. (2013) also investigate how salience in terms of media coverage affects the probability of
early agreements. While the expected effect is negative, this study shows that early agreements
are equally likely to involve salient proposals as agreements at later stages of the co-decision
procedure.2
The analysis in this paper builds upon this research and seeks to explicitly investigate pref-
erence divergence and salience as key indicators for explaining ﬁrst-reading non-agreement.
The choice to single out these indicators is based on veto bargaining models with incomplete
information (Cameron and McCarty, 2004). If the actors have complete information, it follows
that all legislative dossiers should be decided as early agreements. This is still not the case in
the EU although there has been a notable increase in fast-track legislation. Testing the directly
applicable predictions from veto bargaining theory is the ﬁrst contribution that this paper makes
to the existing literature. The second contribution to the literature is reﬁned measurement of
the key indicators. Both indicators are tested in two different ways, and each indicator thus
has two different operationalisations. In the ﬁrst test each member state’s issue position, the
EP position, and the salience the actors assign to their issue positions are measured on a 0-100
scale by policy experts (Thomson et al., 2006, 2012). In the second test, salience is measured
as the number of recitals listed as reasons for adopting the relevant legislative act (Häge, 2007;
Häge and Naurin, 2013). While Rasmussen (2011) and Reh et al. (2013) identify the EP rappor-
teur and the EP median or the EP rapporteur and the presiding minister as the key negotiators,
this analysis singles out the EP median and the Council pivot under qualiﬁed majority voting
(QMV) as the key negotiators (Crombez and Hix, 2013). This choice is based on the voting
2A competing expectation of salience (especially when measured by media coverage) would be a positive
relationship with early agreement. The more media attention, the more demand for urgent action. However, Reh
et al. (2013) ﬁnd no evidence for such a mechanism.
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rules in the respective institutions. The EP needs a simple majority to pass acts in the ﬁrst
reading while the Council usually needs a qualiﬁed majority. Furthermore, by employing data
on EU actor preferences which vary by year and policy area (see (König and Luig, 2012)), the
preference distance variable included in this analysis has more variation than the ones included
in Rasmussen (2011) and Reh et al. (2013) (which use NOMINATE scores (Hix, Noury and
Roland, 2006) and expert survey data (Benoit and Laver, 2006), respectively). The research
design presented after the theoretical framework is thus carefully designed to test the empirical
implications of veto bargaining models with incomplete information.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This theory section seeks to explain why, under the assumption of incomplete information,
some co-decision proposals are adopted in the ﬁrst reading and others are not. The theoretical
foundations are based upon standard models of veto bargaining which generally assume that
the actors have Euclidean preferences (Cameron and McCarty, 2004). That is, they prefer the
policies closest to their own ideal point to policies farther away. For simplicity, the ideal points
of the different actors as well as the location of the existing policy (the status quo), and the new
policy are presented in a one-dimensional space.
The standard models show that if all actors are completely informed about the preferences
of the other actors, vetoes should not occur. This proposition holds regardless of whether the
setting is one-shot veto bargaining or sequential veto bargaining. In the complete information
veto game, the agenda setter is completely informed of the veto player’s preferences and thus
knows which bills will be successful. The agenda setter can propose its most preferred bill from
the set of bills that the veto player will ﬁnd acceptable (Cameron and McCarty, 2004). Consider
Figure 1. Given the ideal point of the agenda setter (A) and the veto player (V) , V will veto any
bill located to the left of the agenda setter and A will not propose any bill located to the right of
the veto player. A successful bill thus has to be located within the interval between the agenda
setter and the veto player.
Similarly in the EU setting, if all actors have complete information with regard to the pref-
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A V 
Figure 1: Veto game with complete information: Any successful bill will be located within the
interval between the agenda setter (A) and the veto player (V)
erences of the other actors, ﬁrst-reading non-agreement under co-decision should not occur.
Under the assumption of complete information, the EP should present the Council with amend-
ments to the Commission proposal that it knows that the Council will accept. But ﬁrst-reading
non-agreements do occur. In line with veto bargaining models, relaxing the assumption of
complete information is necessary to explain the incidences of non-agreement. If the EP has
incomplete information, non-agreement may occur due to the EP overestimating its ability to
extract concessions from the Council.
The theoretical assumption of incomplete information in EU bargaining can be defended
empirically. While the EP negotiates in public, Council negotiations are traditionally undertaken
behind closed doors (Stasavage, 2004).3 Hence the Council has much more information about
the preference conﬁguration within the EP than the EP has about the preferences of the different
Council members. Incomplete information games require two conditions to be in place (see
Fearon (1995)). The ﬁrst one is uncertainty. At least one of the main actors needs to have
doubts with regard to the type of the other actor. The secrecy of Council negotiations ensures
3In July 2006 the Council started to open more of its debates to the public. These open sessions are available
as web-cast transmissions at the Consilium webpage.
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that the EP cannot be certain of the positions of the pivotal actors within the Council. The
Council therefore has private information. The second condition is incentives to present its
own type wrongly in order to extract concessions from the other main actor. If the preference
distribution within the Council is signiﬁcantly different from the preference distribution within
the EP, the Council can clearly beneﬁt from signalling a more extreme position in order to obtain
a policy closer to its own ideal point. In such situations, the Council will prefer not to reveal its
(true) private information to the EP.
In the following, which is based on veto models with (in)complete information (Cameron
and McCarty, 2004), the Council and the EP are presented as unitary actors. The ideal point
of the Council is assumed to be the position of the pivotal government in the Council under
co-decision. Since the Council usually decides by qualiﬁed majority voting (QMV) under co-
decision, the government that is pivotal for a rightward (leftward) move is located to the left
(right) of the government with the median vote. In practice, the government with the 5/7th vote
is pivotal for a policy move to the left and the government with the 2/7th vote is pivotal for a
policy move to the right if the status quo is located as illustrated in Figure 2. The EP votes
by simple majority in the ﬁrst reading under co-decision. Hence, given the assumption of uni-
dimensionality, the pivotal member of the EP (MEP) is the median member of this institution
(Crombez and Hix, 2013).4 After the Commission has initiated a legislative proposal, the EP
can present amendments to the proposal that the Council can choose to accept. According to
the logic set out in Figure 1, the EP thus serves as the agenda setter and the Council as the veto
player in ﬁrst reading co-decision bargaining.
Figure 2 shows EU bargaining with complete and incomplete information. Here, the policy
outcome (the adopted bill) is denoted as B and the Council position is either denoted as M or E
depending on whether the pivot is moderate (M) or extreme (E). Figures 2a) and b) are possible
scenarios when the EP is completely informed about the preference conﬁguration within the
Council. If the EP knows that the Council pivot is moderate (Figure 2a)), the EP will propose
amendments to the Commission proposal that reﬂect its own ideal position. Since the Council
4Crombez and Hix (2013) argue that since the EU uses strict germaneness rules (amendments should be on-
topic only), decision making on one dimension can be studied as if it were the only relevant dimension.
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a) Complete information: Council = moderate (M) 
M EP=B SQ 
b) Complete information: Council = extreme (E) 
E EP SQ B 
Preferred by E & M 
E M EP=Bm 
Preferred by M only 
SQ Be 
c) Incomplete information: Council either moderate (M) or extreme (E) 
Figure 2: Bargaining game with complete and incomplete information: Council pivot either
moderate (M) or extreme (E)
pivot prefers such a policy outcome over the status quo, the adopted bill will be identical to the
EP position. However, the EP will be worse off if the Council pivot is extreme (Figure 2b)). An
extreme pivot will not accept EP’s ideal position and the adopted bill will be located between
the position of the Council pivot and the EP position. Note, that the bill adopted in Figure 2b) is
closer to the moderate Council pivot’s position than the bill adopted in Figure 2a) when the EP
knows that the Council pivot is a moderate type. This provides the Council with an incentive
not to reveal its true type in the early stages of inter-institutional bargaining.
Under incomplete information, the EP cannot determine with certainty what type of Council
the Council really is. To simplify, the EP does not know whether the Council pivot has an
extreme or moderate position. The set of bills an extreme Council pivot prefers is only a subset
of the bills that a moderate Council pivot prefers. Figure 2c) illustrates this argument. Bill Bm,
which is the outcome of bargaining when the Council pivot is moderate, is clearly preferable
to the EP than bill Be which is the outcome of bargaining when the Council pivot is extreme.
However, the EP may falsely believe that the Council pivot is moderate and propose Bm which
the extreme Council pivot will then refuse to accept.
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The veto bargaining models with incomplete information generate several predictions of
when vetoes are more likely to occur. Two of these predictions can be directly used to ex-
plaining why ﬁrst-reading non-agreements under co-decision do happen. The ﬁrst of these two
predictions is that vetoes are more likely to occur the larger the difference between the ideal
points of the pivotal actors (Cameron and McCarty, 2004). In the EU setting, this prediction
can be transferred to ﬁrst-reading non-agreement under co-decision. Figure 2 can easily illus-
trate why this is the case (for the mathematical proof see Cameron and McCarty (2004)). If
the distance between the EP pivot and the Council pivot increases, the Council pivot is more
likely to be extreme than to be moderate (vis-a-vis the EP). Under the condition of incomplete
information the EP cannot know with certainty whether the Council is moderate or extreme.
Still, the EP can beneﬁt the most from proposing a bill close to its ideal position. Recognising
that later rounds of decision making are costly to the Council (Häge and Kaeding, 2007), the EP
knows that there is a probability that the Council will accept its proposal. The probability of the
Council accepting the EP proposal is reduced when the distance between the two policy makers
increases. Hence, larger preference heterogeneity can be assumed to reduce the probability of
ﬁrst-reading agreements in the EU.
The second prediction that can be borrowed from veto bargaining models with incomplete
information is the result that the importance the actors assign to the bill matters for the proba-
bility of vetoes occurring or not. Given disagreement between the pivotal actors, more salient
bills are more likely to be vetoed than less important ones and more likely to be re-passed if
vetoed (Cameron, 2000). This is due to the agenda setter’s incentive to put forward more risky
proposals if the agenda setter cares highly about the policy content. Bargaining is assumed to
be tougher for important bills. The second prediction is generated from sequential veto bargain-
ing models while the ﬁrst prediction holds for both one-shot games and sequential bargaining
(Cameron and McCarty, 2004).
In the EU setting, the two predictions from the veto bargaining models can be transformed
into a theoretical framework that seeks to explain the frequent occurrence of ﬁrst-reading non-
agreement under the co-decision procedure:
H1 First-reading agreement is less likely to occur the greater the distance between the ideal
117
points of the Council pivot and the EP median.
H2 First-reading agreement is less likely to occur the greater the importance attached to the
legislative proposal.
The statistical analysis in this paper tests whether these two predictions can contribute to
explaining why some proposals can be agreed upon at the ﬁrst-reading stage of the co-decision
procedure while others cannot. Figure 3 shows how the theoretical framework relates to the
research design.
EP 
Council 
No agreement 
EP 
Council 
Agreement 
2nd reading or 
later 
1st reading 
Agreement if: 
1. Preference 
homogeneity 
2. Low importance 
Figure 3: Co-decision bargaining under incomplete information
DATA AND METHOD
The analysis in this paper runs two different tests of the hypothesised relationships between the
key independent variables and the dependent variable First-reading agreement. The ﬁrst test is
based on positional data taken from the “Decision Making in the European Union (DEUI/II)”
project (Thomson et al., 2006, 2012). In this data set, the issue-speciﬁc positions of the dif-
ferent member states, the Commission, and the European Parliament are measured by policy
experts on a 0-100 scale reﬂecting the policy distances between the different actors. The ref-
erence point (similar to the concept of status quo), the policy outcome, and the salience that
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the actors attach to the issues are also identiﬁed with this scale. The above data were collected
through 349 semi-structured interviews with key informants. Altogether the data set contains
331 controversial issues nested in 125 legislative proposals that were introduced between 1996
and 2008 (Thomson et al., 2012). For the purpose of this paper, only co-decision proposals are
relevant. This reduces the data set to 183 issues raised by 64 legislative proposals.
The second test utilises the European Union Policy-Making (EUPOL) data set and the sub-
sample and extension to the EUPOL data employed in Häge (2007).5 The EUPOL data set
covers all information contained in the European Commission PreLex database for the years
between 1975 and 2009 (Häge, 2011a). The second test also employs data taken from the
EUropean Legislation and Ideological positions in policy Spaces (EULIS) data set (see König
and Luig (2012)) and the monthly summaries of Council acts.
The dependent variable, First-reading agreement, is used in both tests and is taken from the
EUPOL data set. This binary variable is coded 0 if agreement was reached at later stages than
the ﬁrst reading and coded 1 if only one reading was needed to adopt the relevant legislation.
While Rasmussen (2011) also codes ﬁrst-reading agreement as early agreement, Reh et al.
(2013) measure early agreements as ﬁrst and early second-reading agreements that include an
informal compromise between the EP and the Council. While the latter measurement is very
efﬁcient in the sense that it removes uncontroversial ﬁrst-reading agreements from the early
agreements category, it is not suitable for the theoretical framework employed in this paper
which focuses on why not all proposals are adopted at the ﬁrst-reading stage. However, redoing
the analysis with early second-reading agreements (where the EP has accepted the Council’s
common position without amendments) as part of the early agreement category yields similar
results to those presented in this paper. To control for noncontroversial ﬁrst-reading agreements,
the second test includes a variable that measures whether the EP made any amendments to the
proposal in question.
The independent variable employed in the ﬁrst test is a combination of the two key variables
Salience and Distance between EP median-Council pivot. Each position is weighted by the
5The data sample in Häge (2007) consists of 439 legislative proposals on internal EU policies (not international
agreements). Due to the research question only the co-decision proposals of this sample are applicable to the
analysis in this paper.
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salience the actor attached to the issue. In practice, all issue positions were multiplied by the
respective salience estimates and then divided by 100. This ensures that the results are not driven
by extreme positions which are not prioritised by the actors that hold them (Aksoy, 2012; Cross,
2013). The Council pivot is identiﬁed by taking the 5/7th percentile of the salience-weighted
positional distribution vis-a-vis the reference point. This is the pivotal actor when the Council
decides by QMV which it usually does under co-decision. If the reference point is 0, the Council
pivot is located to the left hand side of the scale. If the reference point is 100, the Council pivot
is located to the right hand side of the scale. After this the absolute salience-weighted distance
between the Council pivot and the EP position is calculated.
There are some missing positions in the DEUI/II data set. Failure to account for this may
seriously bias the results (Little, 1992; Honaker and King, 2010). In the DEU sub-sample em-
ployed in this paper, 39 of 75 pre-enlargement and 42 of 108 post-enlargement issues have
complete positional information. Even though the level of missingness is not very high, the
analysis employs the iterative imputation method Multiple imputation using chained equations
(MICE) for robustness purposes (see van Buuren, Boshuizen and Knook (1999) for a detailed
account of MICE). Here, the missing values are imputed on an issue-by-issue basis where pre-
dictive mean matching (PMM) selects the predicted values closest to the observed ones. The
other observed positional values on one issue are thus used to predict the missing values on that
particular issue. The analysis is run with both MICE and list-wise deletion of missing values.6
Descriptive statistics for both the imputed and unimputed data sets are presented in Table 1.
N Mean S.d. Min Max
Dependent variable
First-reading agreement 183 0.31 0.46 0 1
Independent variables
Issue level: List-wise deletion
Salience-weighted positional difference EP median-Council pivot 174 41.3 31.2 0 100
Issue level: MICE imputation
Salience-weighted positional difference EP median-Council pivot 183 40.3 32.1 0 100
Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Co-decision proposals from DEUI/II
6With regard to the application of MICE in this analysis, a standard number of ﬁve imputed data sets are created
and the ﬁrst imputation is drawn after an initial burn-in-period of 200 iterations.
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The second test is conducted on 247 co-decision proposals introduced between 2000 and
2003 (Häge, 2007). The independent variables in this test are coded as follows. The Distance
between EP median-Council pivot is based on the EULIS data set which combines issue-speciﬁc
Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data with the EU legislative agenda. While political
parties are relatively constant in their ideological positions on each issue, the relative importance
of each issue on the EU legislative agenda is not ﬁxed. By weighting issues by their yearly
prominence on the legislative agenda for the different EU policy sectors, more time and area
variation is secured. The issue-speciﬁc party positions are then aggregated to a left/right and
national/supranational dimension (König and Luig, 2012).
On the basis of this information, the upper and lower (5/7th and 2/7th percentile) Council
pivots are identiﬁed for each of the policy sectors, on both policy dimensions, with regard to
the applicable years in the data set. The Council pivot is calculated from the year and sector-
speciﬁc distribution of mean government positions within the Council. Data on the composition
of national governments is taken from the ParlGov data set (Döring and Manow, 2011). The EP
median is identiﬁed by the same procedure as Crombez and Hix (2013). Each member of the EP
(MEP) is assigned the same position as its national party. To combine MEP party information
with the EULIS data set, background data from the data set used in Hix, Noury and Roland
(2006) is utilised. After merging the data, the median within each political group is calculated.
Finally, the EP median is identiﬁed as the median political group on each dimension for the
different sectors and years in the EULIS data. The Distance between EP median-Council pivot
variable is then created as the absolute distance between these actors within the two institutions.
Since it is logical to assume that the Council pivot is the upper or lower (5/7th or 2/7th) actor
that generates the largest distance to the EP median, the variable is further operationalised as
the largest absolute distance between the actors.7
The Salience of a dossier is measured as the number of recitals in the original Commission
proposal. Recitals are listed reasons for adopting the particular piece of legislation and the
importance of a piece is assumed to be positively correlated with the number of reasons provided
7Since the Distance between EP median-Council pivot variable has more variation when measured on the pro-
anti integration dimension, the logit models presented in the results section include this version of the distance
variable. See the appendix for the results when this variable is generated on the basis of the left-right dimension.
The results are similar although less robust.
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for its adoption (Häge, 2007; Häge and Naurin, 2013).8
The variables More than one policy area, Any EP amendment, First-reading Council con-
sensus, Ministers involved up to ﬁrst Council decision and dummy variables for the largest
policy areas are included as controls in the second test of the hypothesised relationships. These
variables take the value 1 if the proposal is subjected to the labelled characteristic and 0 other-
wise. All the control variables except for First-reading Council consensus are taken from the
EUPOL data set (Häge, 2007, 2011a).
N Mean S.d. Min Max
Dependent variable
First-reading agreement 247 0.34 0.47 0 1
Independent variables
Proposal level
Distance between EP median-Council pivot 247 0.99 0.34 0.35 1.91
Salience 247 15.64 9.24 1 62
More than one policy area 247 0.68 0.47 0 1
Any EP amendment 247 0.90 0.30 0 1
First-reading Council consensus 247 0.83 0.37 0 1
Ministers involved up to ﬁrst Council decision 247 0.71 0.45 0 1
Internal market, Consumers and Tourism 247 0.20 0.40 0 1
Transport-Telecommunications 247 0.27 0.44 0 1
Environment 247 0.15 0.35 0 1
Economic and Financial Affairs 247 0.12 0.32 0 1
Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Data from EUPOL/EULIS/Council monthly summaries
First-reading Council consensus is based on voting information from the monthly sum-
maries of Council acts.9 The variable is coded as 1 if the proposal was decided by consensus
and as 0 if one or more member states voted against or abstained. While information concern-
ing voting on ﬁnal acts is enough for ﬁrst-reading agreements, records from the ﬁrst-reading
(non-ﬁnal) voting stage are needed for acts adopted at later stages. The latter information is
more scarce for the time frame in this paper, so this variable contains some measurement bias.
Even so, it may be useful to control for Council consensus since this indicator can measure
controversy variation from proposal to proposal and not only between year and sector as cap-
8Reh et al. (2013) use recitals to measure the complexity of a proposal but ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect of this
variable on early agreement in their analysis.
9The monthly summaries: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/documents/legislative-transparency/.
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tured by the Distance between EP median-Council pivot variable.10 The latter argument rests
on the assumption than negative Council votes are synonymous with controversy in the sense
that preferences had to be particularly compromised in the bargaining.
The descriptive statistics of the variables included in the second test are shown in Table 2.11
Both tests employ a logistic regression model due to the binary nature of the dependent vari-
able First-reading agreement. Test diagnostics conﬁrm that the logit models are appropriately
speciﬁed and ﬁtted to the data. Since the inverse-logistic function is curved, the expected dif-
ference in y corresponding to a ﬁxed difference in x is not a constant (Gelman and Hill, 2007).
The probability that First-reading agreement equals 1 is modelled as:
Pr(Yi = 1) = logit
−1(βxi)
Here the assumption is that the outcomes yi are independent given these probabilities (Gel-
man and Hill, 2007).
10It would also be preferable to include a variable based on EP roll-call votes. However, since the EP explic-
itly votes on approximately 30 percent of all legislation, such a variable would have reduced the data sample
accordingly (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007).
11Note, that there is no evidence of severe multicollinearity between the independent variables. Salience and
Ministers involved up to ﬁrst Council decision show the highest bivariate correlation (.46) and thus only correlate
moderately.
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RESULTS
The results for the ﬁrst test are presented in Table 3 and the results for the second test are
presented in Table 4. The results are shown as odds ratios where odds ratios greater than 1
indicate a positive effect on the dependent variable and odds ratios less than 1 indicate a negative
effect. Both tests conﬁrm the two theoretical expectations: the greater the salience of a dossier
and the greater the distance between the EP median and the Council pivot, the lower the odds of
ﬁrst-reading agreement. These ﬁndings also hold when relevant controls are added to the second
test. Observations that have disproportionately high inﬂuence on the results (i.e. observations
with high Cook’s Distance values) are removed in both tests.
Table 3: Effect of salience-weighted positional difference between EP median and Council pivot
on ﬁrst-reading agreement
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st reading 1st reading 1st reading 1st reading
Listwise deletion MICE
Salience-weighted positional 0.988∗∗ 0.988∗∗ 0.989∗∗ 0.989∗∗
distance between EP and Council (-1.97) (-1.97) (-1.99) (-2.20)
Constant 0.683 0.683 0.642∗ 0.642
(-1.43) (-1.00) (-1.75) (-1.22)
Observations (issues) 162 162 173 173
Proposals 62 62 64 64
Log likelihood -98.07 -98.07 -103.7 -103.7
Exponentiated coefﬁcients (odds ratios); t statistics in parentheses
Model 2 and 4 clustered at proposal level
Extreme outliers are removed from the analysis
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
With regard to the ﬁrst test, four different models are estimated (see Table 3). Models 1-2
delete issues with missing values while Models 3-4 impute missing issue positions. Since the
issues are nested within proposals, Models 2 and 4 are clustered at the proposal level. The
results are similar across the four models. Consider Models 1-2, a one unit (on the 0-100 scale)
increase in the salience-weighted positional distance between the EP median and the Council
pivot reduces the odds of ﬁrst-reading agreement by 1.2 percent ((1-0.988)100). This effect is
signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level and is plotted on the basis of predicted values in Figure 4. Figure
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(a) List-wise deletion of missing issues (b) Imputation of missing issues
Figure 4: Predicted probabilities: Salience-weighted positional distance EP median-Council
pivot
4a) shows the result when list-wise deletion is used while 4b) shows the result when missing
positions are imputed. Both ﬁgures show a clear negative tendency; the predicted probability of
ﬁrst-reading agreement decreases as the salience-weighted positional distance between the EP
median and the Council pivot increases.
The second test includes relevant controls and assesses the effects of the two key indicators
by separate measures instead of one combined measure. The results shown in Table 4 conﬁrm
the ﬁnding from the ﬁrst test. The greater the distance between the EP median and the Council
pivot and the greater the salience of a proposal, the lower the odds of ﬁrst-reading agreement
across the institutions. Recall that the variable Any EP amendment controls for uncontroversial
ﬁrst-reading agreements (the ones where the EP did not make any amendments to the Commis-
sion proposal). The results also hold when this variable is included (Models 2-4).
Consider Model 4 in Table 4, a one unit increase in the distance between the EP median
and the Council pivot reduces the odds of ﬁrst-reading agreement by a factor of 0.155. The
latter ﬁnding is based on the EP median-Council pivot distance being measured on the pro-anti
integration dimension. See Table 6 in the appendix for similar but slightly less robust results
when the distance is measured on the left-right dimension.12
12Table 7 in the appendix shows the results when both distance variables are included. In these models, the
variable that measures ideological distance on the left-right dimension does not have any signiﬁcant effect on the
dependent variable. The models are nevertheless included for reference as the two distance variables are only
moderately correlated.
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Table 4: Determinants of ﬁrst-reading agreement
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st reading 1st reading 1st reading 1st reading
Distance between EP median 0.157∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
and Council pivot (-3.84) (-3.91) (-3.83) (-3.48)
Salience 0.903∗∗∗ 0.921∗∗∗ 0.944∗∗ 0.946∗∗
(-4.47) (-3.42) (-2.29) (-2.17)
More than one policy area 0.786 0.757 0.723
(-0.76) (-0.86) (-0.98)
Any EP amendment 0.279∗∗ 0.474 0.470
(-2.53) (-1.38) (-1.39)
First reading Council consensus 0.721 0.725 0.760
(-0.79) (-0.77) (-0.65)
Ministers involved up to ﬁrst 0.356∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗
Council decision (-2.67) (-2.55)
Internal Market, Consumers 1.363
and Tourism (0.66)
Transport-Telecommunications 1.436
(0.80)
Environment 1.383
(0.63)
Economic and Financial Affairs 0.936
(-0.11)
Constant 12.10∗∗∗ 47.38∗∗∗ 42.36∗∗∗ 33.75∗∗∗
(4.07) (4.62) (4.44) (3.92)
Observations 244 244 244 244
Log likelihood -134.8 -130.8 -127.2 -126.7
Exponentiated coefﬁcients (odds ratios); t statistics in parentheses
Three extreme outliers are removed from the analysis
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
126
(a) EP median-Council pivot distance (b) Salience
Figure 5: Predicted probabilities: EP median-Council pivot distance and salience
Furthermore, a one unit increase in salience (meaning in the number of reasons provided for
its adoption by the initial Commission proposal) reduces the odds of ﬁrst-reading agreement by
5.4 percent when controlling for the other variables. In other words, the odds of ﬁrst-reading
agreement are reduced by a factor of 0.946.
Figure 5 plots the substantial effects on the basis of the predicted values from Model 3
in Table 4 (the other variables are ﬁxed at the mean). Figure 5a) illustrates that preference
divergence between the pivotal actors in the two institutions is negatively associated with ﬁrst-
reading agreement. The negative relationship with the dependent variable is stronger for high
levels of preference divergence. Similarly, Figure 5b) shows that salient dossiers are negatively
related to ﬁrst-reading agreement. As the level of salience reaches its maximum value, the
probability of early agreement drops.
The substantial effects from Model 3 (Table 4) are further explored in Figure 6. Although
theoretically expected, there is no robust interaction between Salience and Distance between
EP median and Council pivot (see Table 5 in the appendix). Still, Figure 6a) shows that the
effect of preference divergence does vary with salience when low and high levels of salience
are considered. Non-salient legislation with low preference divergence is predicted to be more
than 0.6 more likely to be adopted at the ﬁrst reading than highly salient legislation with low
preference divergence. However, levels of salience matter less when the preference divergence
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(a) By salience (b) By ministers decided ﬁrst decision
Figure 6: Predicted probabilities: Distance EP median-Council pivot by salience and ministerial
involvement
between the pivotal actors increases. 6b) illustrates that the effect of preference divergence
also varies to some extent by ministerial involvement. If ministers are not involved in the
decision making and the preference divergence is low, the probability of ﬁrst-reading agreement
is higher than when ministers are involved and the preference divergence is low. The difference
in predicted probability is reduced when the distance between the EP median and the Council
pivot increases. Even so, this analysis conﬁrms the negative relationship between ministerial
involvement and ﬁrst-reading agreements identiﬁed by Häge and Naurin (2013).
In Model 4 (Table 4), the odds of ﬁrst-reading agreement are reduced by a factor of 0.319
when ministers are involved. Häge and Naurin (2013) ﬁnd that ﬁrst-reading agreements have
a negative effect on the likelihood of ministerial involvement, and argue that this reduces the
democratic legitimacy of these agreements. While this claim is supported by the analysis in
this paper, robust evidence is also found for the notion that ﬁnal decisions on highly salient and
controversial proposals are not taken in the ﬁrst reading. On this type of proposals, ministers
are more likely to be involved. Altogether this shows that salient and controversial cases are
decided in a more transparent manner and are not dependent on the outcome of ﬁrst-reading
informal trialogue bargaining.
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CONCLUSION
Standard models of veto bargaining show that if the actors in EU bargaining have complete
information with regard to the positions of the other actors, agreement at later stages than the
ﬁrst reading should not be observed. Although the number of ﬁrst reading agreements under
the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision) has steadily increased since the introduction of
the Amsterdam Treaty, agreement across the EP and the Council is frequently reached at later
stages than the ﬁrst reading. The assumption of complete information can thus be relaxed in the
EU setting.
Veto bargaining models with incomplete information infer two propositions that can be
applicable to bargaining scenarios with the possibility of more than one round: 1) The greater
the distance between the ideal points of the pivotal actors and 2) the greater the salience, the
greater the probability of more than one round of bargaining.
The analysis in this paper conﬁrms both expectations and shows that preference divergence
and salience are negatively associated with ﬁrst-reading agreements in the EU. When legislative
proposals are highly salient and the distance between the EP median and the Council pivot
is large, agreement is signiﬁcantly less likely to be reached at the ﬁrst-reading stage. These
ﬁndings are robust across two different empirical tests. The ﬁrst test employs positional data
at the issue level and the second test utilises proposal-speciﬁc data and introduces relevant
controls.
While previous research on the determinants of early agreements in the EU has mainly
emphasised the negative consequences for democratic legitimacy, this analysis contributes to
the positive side of the debate by showing that highly salient and controversial cases are more
likely to be resolved in a formal and transparent manner with the involvement of accountable
actors. Less salient and less controversial acts are, however, associated with informal trialogue
bargaining at the ﬁrst-reading stage. This analysis is based on proposals adopted in the ﬁfth
term of the EP (1999-2004) and on a small sample of proposals adopted both before and after
the 2004 enlargement. The task of conducting a similar test of the theoretical expectations
on a larger sample of proposals is left for future research. Despite the data limitations of this
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analysis, applying veto bargaining models with incomplete information to the EU bargaining
setting under the co-decision procedure is shown to be a more than useful application. The
theoretical framework and research design can also be further tested empirically on sequential
veto bargaining in other international and national institutions (Cameron, 2000; Cameron and
McCarty, 2004).
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Table 5: Determinants of ﬁrst-reading agreement: Not any robust interaction between salience
and EP-Council distance on the pro-anti integration dimension
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st reading 1st reading 1st reading 1st reading
Distance between EP median 0.106∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
and Council pivot (-3.96) (-3.94) (-3.86) (-3.55)
Salience 0.893∗∗∗ 0.912∗∗∗ 0.934∗∗ 0.935∗∗
(-4.46) (-3.50) (-2.47) (-2.36)
Salience*distance EP-Council 0.874∗ 0.900 0.903 0.899
(-1.71) (-1.35) (-1.30) (-1.32)
More than one policy area 0.831 0.800 0.771
(-0.58) (-0.68) (-0.78)
Any EP amendment 0.307∗∗ 0.518 0.516
(-2.35) (-1.22) (-1.22)
First reading Council consensus 0.714 0.717 0.752
(-0.81) (-0.79) (-0.67)
Ministers involved up to ﬁrst 0.362∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗
Council decision (-2.64) (-2.49)
Internal Market, Consumers 1.416
and Tourism (0.74)
Transport-Telecommunications 1.505
(0.89)
Environment 1.366
(0.60)
Economic and Financial Affairs 1.014
(0.02)
Constant 0.358∗∗∗ 1.601 2.112 1.760
(-5.47) (0.74) (1.14) (0.76)
Observations 244 244 244 244
Log likelihood -133.2 -129.8 -126.3 -125.7
Exponentiated coefﬁcients (odds ratios); t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: Determinants of ﬁrst-reading agreement: Models with left-right EP-Council distance
instead of pro-anti integration EP-Council distance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st reading 1st reading 1st reading 1st reading
Left-right distance 0.297∗ 0.312 0.263∗ 0.191∗∗
EP median-Council pivot (-1.72) (-1.61) (-1.80) (-2.07)
Salience 0.915∗∗∗ 0.930∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗ 0.952∗∗
(-4.26) (-3.25) (-2.01) (-2.04)
More than one policy area 0.718 0.684 0.656
(-1.07) (-1.20) (-1.30)
Any EP amendment 0.339∗∗ 0.600 0.560
(-2.20) (-0.96) (-1.08)
First reading Council consensus 0.735 0.765 0.813
(-0.76) (-0.65) (-0.49)
Ministers involved up to ﬁrst 0.332∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗
Council decision (-2.92) (-2.40)
Internal Market, Consumers 2.529∗∗
and Tourism (1.97)
Transport-Telecommunications 1.318
(0.62)
Environment 1.264
(0.46)
Economic and Financial Affairs 0.929
(-0.13)
Constant 3.689∗∗ 11.95∗∗∗ 11.72∗∗∗ 10.82∗∗∗
(2.43) (3.27) (3.20) (2.95)
Observations 244 244 244 244
Log likelihood -141.3 -137.9 -133.6 -131.0
Exponentiated coefﬁcients (odds ratios); t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 7: Determinants of ﬁrst-reading agreement: Models with both pro-anti integration and
left-right EP-Council distance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st reading 1st reading 1st reading 1st reading
Pro-anti integration distance 0.161∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
EP median-Council pivot (-3.47) (-3.60) (-3.44) (-2.85)
Left-right distance 0.907 1.045 0.847 0.828
EP median-Council pivot (-0.13) (0.06) (-0.21) (-0.20)
Salience 0.903∗∗∗ 0.921∗∗∗ 0.944∗∗ 0.946∗∗
(-4.45) (-3.42) (-2.26) (-2.17)
More than one policy area 0.788 0.753 0.720
(-0.75) (-0.87) (-0.99)
Any EP amendment 0.279∗∗ 0.479 0.474
(-2.53) (-1.36) (-1.37)
First reading Council consensus 0.719 0.733 0.767
(-0.79) (-0.74) (-0.62)
Ministers involved up to ﬁrst 0.353∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗
Council decision (-2.67) (-2.51)
Internal Market, Consumers 1.414
and Tourism (0.69)
Transport-Telecommunications 1.412
(0.75)
Environment 1.363
(0.59)
Economic and Financial Affairs 0.949
(-0.09)
Constant 12.49∗∗∗ 46.83∗∗∗ 44.28∗∗∗ 34.68∗∗∗
(3.82) (4.47) (4.36) (3.90)
Observations 244 244 244 244
Log likelihood -134.8 -130.8 -127.2 -126.6
Exponentiated coefﬁcients (odds ratios); t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Concluding remarks
The papers of this thesis have shown that preferences have a robust effect on observed voting
behaviour and implementation behaviour in the EU. Preferences also affect the dynamics of
EU decision making in terms of how long it takes to reach agreement and in which reading
the ﬁnal decision is taken. Figure 1 summarises the main ﬁndings of the thesis in light of the
previous ﬁndings in the literature with regard to the effect of preferences for the different topics
analysed. This summary also illustrates the explicit contributions made by the thesis to the
existing literature. The analyses presented have strived: 1) to improve and extend the tested
measures, 2) to appropriately account for missing data and 3) to consistently control for the
salience attached to a proposal. Hence, although the framework of the thesis is grounded in
the invaluable research conducted on the four different topics, the different analyses have also
endeavoured to contribute to the cumulative improvement of the research ﬁeld.
On topic 1 (see Figure 1), Paper 1 shows that governments vote in line with their salience-
weighted positions and that this relationship is stronger when missing positions are imputed
iteratively. While the main ﬁnding is compatible with the previous research, it also nuances the
so called “culture of consensus” as evidence of such a culture does not mean that the majority
of Council members vote against their positions. The “culture of consensus” should hence be
treated as a variable rather than a constant in Council decision making (Schneider, 2008).
With regard to topic 2, Paper 2 builds upon previous compliance research by adding a voting
variable to an extended quantitative analysis of directives from all the main EU policy areas be-
fore and after the 2004 enlargement. This paper shows that voting behaviour is connected with
implementation behaviour. This ﬁnding indicates that preferences (revealed by voting) have
consequences for the implementation stage. In terms of practical implications, the Commission
may thus beneﬁt from keeping an extra eye on dissenting member states to reduce possible
infringements.
Paper 3 is embedded in topic 3 and accounts for the duration of EU decision making. This
analysis adds indicators not previously investigated in this particular setting to the analysis of
legislative efﬁciency in the EU. Speciﬁcally, it is shown that greater inter-institutional distance
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Topic Findings of the literature Findings of the thesis 
1)Council voting and 
Council dimensional 
space 
1) Council decision making is guided by a “culture 
of consensus” 
2)Although positional data and voting data have 
been studied separately, the identified political 
space is quite similar across previous studies 
1)Governments are guided by their salience-
weighted issue-specific positions when voting in 
the Council. Positional data and voting data are 
thus compatible 
2)This relationship is stronger when missing 
positions are imputed on an issue-by-issue basis 
2)Compliance of EU 
directives 
1) Policies on which there were preference 
divergence at the decision-making stage are likely 
to be prioritised by the Commission to ease 
member state transposition 
2) Dissent in Council bargaining has no 
substantial effect on (non)-compliance 
3) Positional incentives to deviate increase the 
odds of infringements 
1)Preference-based explanations for non-
compliance perform better when accounting for 
infringements than transposition delay 
2)Dissent in Council bargaining increases the odds 
of infringements 
3)Salience-weighted positional incentives to 
deviate increase the odds of infringements 
 
3)Duration of EU 
decision making 
1) Margaret Thatcher (proxy for anti-EU 
government) delayed EU decision making 
2) Left-right distance in the Council is not a strong 
indicator of the duration of EU decision-making 
3) Regulations and decisions take shorter time to 
decide than directives (where preferences are 
assumed to matter more) and policy areas with 
more homogenous preference distributions have 
shorter durations than other policy areas 
1)Dissent in Council voting slows down EU decision 
making 
2)Greater left-right distance between the ideal 
points of the pivotal actors slows down inter-
institutional decision making 
3)Salient proposals and proposals with ministerial 
involvement take longer to decide than less salient 
proposals and proposals decided in committees 
4)Early agreements 
under the co-
decision procedure 
1) Greater distance between the EP rapporteur 
and the EP plenary or presiding minister, reduces 
the likelihood of first-reading agreement 
2) Salient proposals are just as likely as non-
salient proposals to be associated with early 
agreement 
First-reading agreements are less likely to occur: 
(1) the greater the distance between the ideal 
points of the Council pivot and the EP median and 
(2) the greater the salience attached to the 
proposal 
      
Figure 1: Findings of the literature vs. ﬁndings of the thesis
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between the pivotal actors within the Council and the EP and dissent in Council voting in-
crease the time it takes to reach agreement across the institutions. While previous studies on
this topic ﬁrst and foremost have focused on the Council, this paper attempts to account for
inter-institutional decision making. The ﬁndings indicate that EU law making is more prone to
gridlock if there is greater variation in left-right positions of the pivotal actors.
In paper 4, the implications of bargaining models with incomplete information are applied
in order to explain early agreements under the co-decision procedure. The ﬁndings of the two
empirical tests conducted support the theoretical framework: First-reading agreements are less
likely to occur (1) the greater the distance between the pivotal actors in the Council and the EP
and (2) the greater the salience attached to a proposal. These ﬁndings are substantially important
as they indicate that salient and controversial proposals are negotiated more transparently than
less salient and less controversial proposals.
While the main ﬁndings have been thoroughly elaborated by the previous parts of the thesis,
this part discusses the more overarching issues related to the research presented. The thesis
relates speciﬁcally to three grand issues of the EU decision making literature: 1) theories of
decision making, 2) transparency of decisions and 3) selection biases in decision-making data.
The following will elaborate on how these issues are connected to each other and the thesis as
such.
With regard to theories of EU decision making, the framework of the thesis is embedded in
rational choice institutionalism. The theoretical set up presented is generally based on previous
decision-making studies and then adjusted to ﬁt the research questions presented in the different
papers. But there is one exception as the last paper of the thesis draws upon decision-making
models with incomplete information where the agenda setter (the EP in the setting of the ﬁrst
reading of the co-decision procedure) cannot know with certainty what type the veto player
(the Council) really is. Researchers are surely aware of the presence of incomplete information
in EU decision making. Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) argue that complete information only ex-
ists in the ﬁnal rounds of decision making. Then the actors have learnt about each other from
previous interactions. While the issue of incomplete information is well acknowledged, few
studies have attempted to speciﬁcally model the uncertainty. Paper 4 of this thesis shows that
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predictions generated from veto bargaining models with incomplete information can contribute
to explain ﬁrst-reading non-agreement in the EU. Future studies may thus beneﬁt from inves-
tigating the theoretical and empirical implications of incomplete information and the effect of
these implications on EU decision making.
On the other side, the increasing number of ﬁrst-reading agreements can serve as an ar-
gument against this path of possible future research. While ﬁrst-reading decisions accounted
for only about 25-30 percent of all legislation made under the co-decision procedure in 2000
and 2001, 90 percent of all co-decision proposals were adopted at ﬁrst reading in 2010 and
2011 (Hix and Høyland, 2013). This trend indicates professionalisation of EU decision making
where some types of actors interact more frequently than others. These actors also meet in
informal arenas and deals are made behind closed doors. This trend can strongly be linked to
the transparency debate in domestic and international bargaining (Stasavage, 2004). Although
increased transparency may also have negative consequences for bargaining outcomes as repre-
sentatives may care more about their own public reputation than the policy outcome, transparent
decision-making undoubtedly makes the representatives more accountable to their constituen-
cies, plenaries and/or governments. Hence, while the early 1990s and early 2000 paved way
for more legislative transparency in EU decision making, the 2010s have produced less trans-
parency in the sense of an increasing number of ﬁrst-reading agreements. This tendency makes
it harder for both researchers and the public to assess “who gets what, when and how” in the
EU legislative process and spurs a need for improved data (Hix and Høyland, 2013). A lack
of open debate on a legislative proposal does not enhance the democratic legitimacy of the EU.
There is also little public debate on the implementation of EU directives. The lack of public
debate on EU issues does not only stem from the institutional set up of the union. The weak
electoral connection between citizens and legislators creates few incentives for national debate
on EU issues (Hix, 2008). The lack of national debate may then also be a contributing factor to
less transparent decision modes at the European level.
The transparency debate is thus complex and can present a trade-off between accountability
and policy outcomes. While transparency produces accountability, it can also produce a smaller
set of possible policy outcomes as the negotiators can be less willing to compromise when their
138
constituents are able “to watch them” (Stasavage, 2004). Limited transparency also produces
selection biases in EU decision-making data. For instance, if all Council and EP negotiations
were open to the public, researchers would have access to data on “failed” legislation. Versions
of proposals that do not receive the sufﬁcient support in order to pass are not ofﬁcially recorded.
This may lead to a biased estimate of the actual level of disagreement as ﬁnal votes only are
taken on a proposal when the proposal has gained the required support (Hug, 2010). The in-
troduction to the thesis elaborated on selection biases in the data sets utilised. Despite these
selection biases, the thesis ﬁnds a link between preferences and behaviour in EU decision mak-
ing. Although we cannot know with certainty the magnitude of selection bias and its effect on
the ﬁndings presented in this thesis, the ﬁndings can support the notion that member states act
in accordance with their structural interests (Bailer, Mattila and Schneider, 2010). While this
thesis has not attempted to examine why some member states vote against a proposal and others
do not beyond the assumption that preferences matter, the empirical support of the broader ar-
gument that “preferences determines voting behaviour which again determines implementation
behaviour” can plausibly rest on preferences being a proxy for structural interests of the differ-
ent member states. The task of investigating structural interests and their impact on the broader
decision-making process in the EU is, however, left for future research.
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